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ID:
076399
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indonesian military sees itself as the guarantor of national unity, the state's last line of defence against separatist movements. This paper argues that the military's methods for maintaining national unity have been counterproductive. Its counter-insurgency wars in Aceh and Papua have exacerbated the sense of alienation from Indonesia that the people in these provinces have felt. In this post-Suharto era of political reform, the military has been unable to recognise that its old methods have failed, even after its obvious failure in East Timor, whose people, after living under a 24-year military occupation, rejected continued integration with Indonesia in a referendum in 1999. The fact that the politicians in the legislative and executive branches of the state have tended to encourage the military to persist with its old methods suggests that the military by itself should not be faulted. Only political resolutions, such as the Helsinki agreement for ending the conflict in Aceh - an agreement that resulted more from the devastation of the December 2004 tsunami than from the Indonesian military's counter-insurgency warfare - offer any guarantee of national unity.
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The Indonesian military sees itself as the guarantor of national unity, the state's last line of defence against separatist movements. This paper argues that the military's methods for maintaining national unity have been counterproductive. Its counter-insurgency wars in Aceh and Papua have exacerbated the sense of alienation from Indonesia that the people in these provinces have felt. In this post-Suharto era of political reform, the military has been unable to recognise that its old methods have failed, even after its obvious failure in East Timor, whose people, after living under a 24-year military occupation, rejected continued integration with Indonesia in a referendum in 1999. The fact that the politicians in the legislative and executive branches of the state have tended to encourage the military to persist with its old methods suggests that the military by itself should not be faulted. Only political resolutions, such as the Helsinki agreement for ending the conflict in Aceh - an agreement that resulted more from the devastation of the December 2004 tsunami than from the Indonesian military's counter-insurgency warfare - offer any guarantee of national unity.
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| 2 |
ID:
082598
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews the data collection methods of East Timor's Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Reception (CAVR), whose 2,500-page report was released in 2006. The CAVR used four methods for gaining information about past human rights violations: oral statements recorded on tape, surveys designed by social scientists, oral interviews by experienced investigators, and community forums. The CAVR report relies heavily on statistical analyses of the oral statements and the surveys. The findings from such statistical analyses turn out to be of limited significance. The most informative parts of the report that convincingly reveal patterns of rights violations and add to what was already known about East Timorese history are based on the oral interviews and community forums
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