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| 1 |
ID:
105688
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to understand the transformation of Turkish civil-military relations in a comparative perspective. The analysis is based on two criteria: institutional/legal mechanisms and political oversight of the military's autonomy. Comparison of European and Middle Eastern civil-military relations models to the Turkish paradigm unveils grave differences between Turkish and Middle Eastern civil-military relations. The Turkish model in transformation for at least a decade is closer to the European model in both legal and political aspects. Nevertheless, the article underscores that Turkish civil-military relations are still in transformation and although the EU accession process has gradually democratized the legal system of the country, democratic consolidation requires further advances in the political domain. Consequently, consolidation in Turkey depends not only on retreating of the military from the political realm but also on the proper civilianization of the regime in theory and practice.
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| 2 |
ID:
105682
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Republican Turkey, the military has always had respect for democracy. However, from 1960 onwards, the military intervened in politics on four occasions. This was because it felt responsible for dealing with internal as well external threats to the country. From 2002 onwards, however, the military began to openly question the very wisdom of intervening in politics. In the following years, the military seemed to have come close to thinking that the civilians "have the right to be wrong."
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| 3 |
ID:
105680
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on the nature of the military's relations with social and political spheres and actors, this study delineates four types of militaries: professional, nation's army, predatory praetorian and popular praetorian. The article shows that the Turkish military constitutes one of the rare epitomes of popular praetorian military and discusses the current state and prospects of civil-military relations in Turkey.
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| 4 |
ID:
076530
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Early indications suggest that the appointment of General Yaþar Büyükanýt as chief of the Turkish general staff (TGS) at the end of August 2006 marked a new era in civil-military relations in the country. Yet it would be a mistake to see the military's more forthright attitude under Büyükanýt simply as a return to the past. Civil-military relations in Turkey have always been characterized by a combination of continuity and change. Both the legal basis for and the TGS's own perceptions of the role and responsibilities of the military have remained unchanged for over 70 years. However, the extent and the manner in which the military has influenced politics have always varied. In recent years the TGS's ability to ensure that government policy remains within acceptable parameters has been primarily based on its public prestige rather than the prospect of a full-blooded military coup. Although the TGS has always been the most respected institution in the country, the Turkish public's willingness to tolerate, or even to encourage, its assumption of a more active political role has traditionally varied according to changes in the prevailing domestic political circumstances: falling during times of stability and confidence and rising during times of uncertainty. In early 2007 both the country and the government of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) appeared to have lost momentum and direction. In such an environment, and in the continued absence of an eff ective political opposition, many Turks will once again look to the country's military to prevent the JDP from increasing its control over the apparatus of state, starting with the appointment of a new president in April 2007. To date the JDP has always backed down in the face of pressure from the TGS. However, whether it will continue to do so, and what the TGS can or will do if the JDP defies its warnings, currently all remain unclear.
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