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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
143027
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has become commonplace to describe the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, as a cult. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott, US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have all used the term, in an apparent attempt to discredit the organisation and strip it of its claim to Islamic credentials. But beyond the label lies a strategic implication: if ISIS is indeed a cult, it cannot be fought as a mere terrorist organisation or a proto-state with territorial ambitions. Cults do not recruit and indoctrinate like other political entities; they do not perform like mere militias on the battlefield; and they follow their own warped logic. Cults are more flexible, more cohesive, more agile and ultimately more challenging than other enemies. Most worryingly, leaving a cult is a difficult endeavour, which means that ISIS returnees are very likely to remain attached to the organisation, regardless of their experience with it. Security services will have to bear ISIS’s cultish characteristics in mind as they work to reduce the threat from the Islamic State.
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| 2 |
ID:
134538
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In spite of geographic proximity and a number of shared interests, the European Union and Libya have a history of strained relations. The war of 2011 provided an opportunity for a fresh start, but so far neither side has been able to reap benefits from an entirely new political situation. Instead, Libya’s difficult internal situation has not only slowed down the process of rapprochement, but also increased EU concern. At a time when cooperation becomes a necessity rather than a choice, Libya is now down-spiralling into implosion at the levels of security, bureaucracy and economy, to the point where it cannot absorb the offers being made.
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| 3 |
ID:
179808
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All Arab states, including the Gulf states, are regularly considered an anomaly in International Relations: allegedly artificially created, lacking clear identity, borders and sovereignty. We challenge this assertion by looking at one dimension of sovereignty often overlooked: the air space. We measure this assertion along the classical lines of sovereignty: do the states have the institutions, regulations and capacity to manage their air space, do they use it for economic and diplomatic purposes, do they have the means to conduct war in it, and does it feature in their national identity? We find that particularly since 1990, the Gulf States have affirmed their sovereignty markedly in all these areas. These findings show two things: that sovereignty can be a feature of a state regardless of the nature of its creation, and that it can be affirmed in a space previously overlooked, the air.
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| 4 |
ID:
120296
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although seen by many as an unequivocal supporter of Gaddafi's power basis, the Libyan military's reaction to the 2011 uprising was far from unified: plagued by desertion as well as disintegration, the regime managed to rely only on the hard core of its armed forces. This was mostly a result of the regime's decade-long coup-proofing measures which rendered it in large parts militarily useless. Weakened at the micro level, the Libyan military was incapable of acting at the macro level in any meaningful way. Sitting at the analytical intersection between internal and external features of the armed forces, the Libyan case provides useful insights on the study of the armed forces.
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| 5 |
ID:
127324
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Libya's current woes were not pre-ordained, but its politics are caught in a vicious circle. Those who created the crisis are the only ones who can resolve it.
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| 6 |
ID:
076543
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