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| 1 |
ID:
140249
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article proposes that the Emergency counterinsurgency campaign of the British colonial state should be viewed as a conjunctural episode of dispossession of Malayan laboring people. Conjunctural episodes of dispossession of working people through state violence and racialized rhetoric emerge as a response to crises in capitalist accumulation occurring at multiple and overlapping scales of capitalist systems – the imperial, the national/colonial, and the local/regional. During these episodes state and capitalist strategies destroy political organizations and solidarities among laboring people and demoralize them over long periods of time, through processes simultaneously material and semiotic. Employing new theorizations of the global anthropology of labor, this article first examines the postwar and Emergency years when the multiethnic and industry-wide bases of Malayan trade unions were destroyed while an estimated half a million working people were forcibly concentrated in so-called New Villages. This had the effect of suppressing a discourse of class and class struggle in favor of a dominant discourse of ethnic conflict. In an effort to articulate class struggle despite the presence of this dominant discourse of essential ethnic difference this essay examines the formation of a new working men's “society” in 1978–1980 and a dispute between truck drivers and truck owners in northern Malaysia.
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| 2 |
ID:
146231
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper uses recently-released material from the ‘migrated archives’ to provide an original counterinsurgency analysis of the TNKU revolt in Brunei and Sarawak from December 1962 to May 1963. It argues that, despite a failure to act upon intelligence predicting the outbreak of insurgency, Britain developed a highly effective counterinsurgency organisation. These records also indicate that decision-makers drew inspiration from the Malayan Emergency to inform success in Brunei. Although Malaya has been challenged as a counterinsurgency paradigm, the Brunei operations show the utility of striking a balance between inappropriately copying from past campaigns and developing best practices applicable to the unique environment of Borneo. In turn, the evolution of effective operational practices in Brunei informed their successful application to the subsequent Indonesian Confrontation.
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| 3 |
ID:
076550
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of 'Distributed Operations' (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the 'Long War'.
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| 4 |
ID:
164294
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.
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| 5 |
ID:
107089
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to explore the introduction and progress of the idea and concept of free speech in Malaysia. It demonstrates that the idea of freedom and liberty has existed since the feudal period of the Malay Sultanate. However, the idea was very limited owing to constraints imposed by the feudal kings. The people saw the kings as divine figures. When the British colonised the Malay states, they introduced the modern Western concept of free speech. This was later embedded in the Malayan/Malaysian Constitution during the country's independence in 1957 as one of the essential fundamental liberties of the people. However, the British were also responsible for introducing several repressive laws, such as the Printing Presses and Publications Ordinance. The Malaysian government continued this policy after independence to the detriment of the practice of free speech in the country.
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| 6 |
ID:
111789
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| 7 |
ID:
110934
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This is an account of the origins and history of the little-known British Advisory Mission in Vietnam (BRIAM), which sought to transfer to Vietnam the techniques used in the Malayan Emergency to isolate insurgents from the population at large, while at the same time winning the loyalty of that population. This article looks first at the situation in South Vietnam and second at how the US and the UK viewed that situation and what they were doing about it. The third section deals with what BRIAM itself tried to do in introducing the process labelled "strategic hamlets". The final section seeks to explain why the process failed.
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| 8 |
ID:
104755
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| 9 |
ID:
110933
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Part of the article is a summary account of the background to, and the course of, the Malayan Emergency, from its beginnings in 1948, through the Briggs plan and the resettlement policy to the final defeat of the communists in 1960. The other part comprises Michael Burton's personal recollections of his experiences and challenges as a young platoon commander in the Green Jackets in 1956/1957 when the communist threat was already waning. Drawing on quotations from the regimental journal, he also describes how the soldiers carried out the tasks so essential to achieve victory.
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| 10 |
ID:
100680
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article describes the Batang Kali incident in which a number of Chinese workers were shot dead by the British army in circumstances which have never been satisfactorily explained. The author, who published a history of the Malayan Emergency some years ago, sets the incident in the wider context of British policy in the somewhat confused early months of the Emergency. He then chronicles the subsequent attempts to re-examine events. He then examines various suggestions that British policy was in general one of deliberate counterterror and concludes that the available evidence does not really substantiate this charge.
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| 11 |
ID:
116259
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
No aspect of British counter-insurgency has been more problematic and controversial than the doctrine of minimum force. This common law principle provided ambiguous guidance for soldiers and police quelling unrest within a global empire and has become the subject of intense scholarly debate in the post-imperial era. The argument divides academics into two broad camps. One group sees minimum force as a vital element of a largely successful, uniquely British approach to counter-insurgency. The other claims that the legal principle never really restrained British security forces and considers the British approach to counter-insurgency neither unique nor particularly successful. This debate appeared in an exchange of views between John Newsinger and the current author in a 1990 volume of Small Wars and Insurgencies and more recently in a similar but lengthier argument between Rod Thornton and Huw Bennett in the same journal between 2007 and 2010.1
Such disagreements are of course endemic to academic discourse. This one, however, seems to be about more than history.
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| 12 |
ID:
126157
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the colonial authorities resettled an estimated half a million rural dwellers, mainly Chinese, from the fringe of the jungle, to cut them off from contact with armed members of the Malayan Communist Party. The re-location led to political alienation among many resettled in the nearly 500 New Villages. Winning their support against the insurgency therefore was urgent. At this juncture, foreign missionaries were forced to leave China following the communist takeover in October 1949. Many of these missionaries were Chinese-speaking with medical or teaching experience. The High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, and his successor, Sir Gerald Templer, invited these and other missionaries to serve in the New Villages. This paper looks at colonial initiatives and mission response amidst the dynamics of domestic politics and a changing international balance of power in the region.
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| 13 |
ID:
184185
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| Summary/Abstract |
The psychiatric cost of Britain’s post-war counter-insurgency campaigns have gone largely un-investigated. Focusing on the Malayan Emergency, this article will show that counter-insurgency operations were sufficiently intense to produce what were conceptualised as cases of mild psychoneurosis. These conditions were managed using convalescence and simple psychotherapy. Managing these conditions in this way risked leaving more serious conditions untreated and meant recorded cases of psychoneurosis were kept artificially low. That the stresses of the counter-insurgency in Malaya were reproduced elsewhere suggests there was a wider psychiatric cost of Britain’s post-war period of decolonisation.
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| 14 |
ID:
141049
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Malayan Emergency, British High Commissioner Henry Gurney pushed the policy of repatriating to China thousands of ‘alien’ Chinese detainees suspected of supporting the Malayan Communist Party's guerrilla war. This article traces the stages of this controversial policy, which, despite obstacles, remained a key counter-insurgency strategy until 1953. But the policy ignored the civil war in China and risked jeopardising Sino–British relations. When China closed its ports, the British administration put forth more desperate proposals to continue repatriation, often in the face of Foreign Office objections, ranging from negotiations with the PRC, to dumping deportees on the coast of China, and even approaching the Formosan government. Yet, while the Chinese were the target of both harsh early counter-insurgency techniques and communist violence, when the faltering repatriation policy was replaced by the mass resettlement of ‘squatters’ in Malaya itself, the Chinese were given a path to citizenship, changing their political future and that of the nation.
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| 15 |
ID:
152028
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| Summary/Abstract |
The utility of naval gunfire support (NGS) during the Malayan Emergency has been the subject of significant scrutiny. While the limitations of NGS were demonstrated in Malaya, it also has proven to be extremely useful under certain circumstances. The circumstances in which NGS has proven effective during earlier and later insurgencies have generally reflected those of the Malayan Emergency. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been less conducive to the application of maritime power, but they did not denote the end of the naval role or the potential usefulness of NGS in counterinsurgency operations. NGS is an unheralded capability, but, aside from the historical significance, it remains relevant in the contemporary era under the right conditions.
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| 16 |
ID:
096507
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| 17 |
ID:
142607
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.
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| 18 |
ID:
103970
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency.
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