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| 1 |
ID:
116065
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for "universal principles of war," a second, "context-dependent," approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a "paradoxical logic" school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a "dominate-mix" approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.
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| 2 |
ID:
076552
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article deals with the specific views of the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) on the theoretical study of war, i.e. his theory on theory. What were Corbett's main ideas and how do they compare with those of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini? To what extent are Corbett's ideas original? The conclusions reached are that, first, the intellectual kinship between Corbett and Clausewitz is especially pronounced in this aspect of military theory. Second, the intellectual affinity between Corbett's and Jomini's views on the theoretical study of war is indeed negligible. Finally, it is argued that Corbett presents only one original idea regarding the theoretical study of war and that this idea is problematic.
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