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| 1 |
ID:
076571
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| 2 |
ID:
077644
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2007.
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| Description |
xv, 272p.
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| Series |
Politics in Asia
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| Standard Number |
9780415415910
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052382 | 355.03305/ODG 052382 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
152472
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using the English school arguments that inter-state regulation ameliorates the consequences of the power politics of international anarchy, I analyze to what extent China pursues a strategic partnership with Russia in Central Asia. I investigate if China has compatible policies with Russia on the use of force, on international legitimacy, and on institutional frameworks for security management. As China is increasingly asserting its security, economic, and institutional interests in Central Asia, similarities and differences have become apparent in relations with Russia. Increased mutual concern for continued regional stability has encouraged Beijing and Moscow to coordinate their policies across a wide range of issue areas. Stability allows them to focus attention and resources on each of their different geostrategic priorities.
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| 4 |
ID:
188210
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| Summary/Abstract |
As global warming accelerates the melting of Arctic ice, opportunities for new transport routes open along with new strategic interests. This article examines how China pursues its interests in the Arctic and, specifically, the degree to which it seeks to work through the existing regime complex versus engaging in bilateral cooperation with Arctic states. China’s willingness to work through the regime complex or use bilateral cooperation depend on the specific issue. We find that China relies on global regimes regarding navigation issues, prefers bilateral cooperation for purposes of resource extraction, and prioritizes Arctic regimes to justify the pursuit of dual-use scientific research. We conclude that as a great power, China is well-positioned to use institutional complexity to its advantage. China uses existing regimes when it benefits Chinese interests, supplemented by bilateral initiatives as appropriate.
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| 5 |
ID:
130422
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's counterinsurgency strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang relies heavily on hard power and imposition. Well-functioning vertical coordination in the security sector of China's political system and assimilationist nationality dynamics combine to favour the use of force against ethnic groups that do not accept the political legitimacy of China's Communist Party. Transnational links contribute to China's difficulties with implementing counterinsurgency in Tibet and help China implement its strategy in Xinjiang. Development strategies aimed at improving living standards are crowded out due to a lack of horizontal coordination between civilian and security agencies and a bias towards unitary nation-building in Chinese nationalism.
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| 6 |
ID:
082676
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's status-quo-oriented post-Cold-War grand strategy of promoting cooperative security and multipolarity on the basis of the UN system is not applied in Northeast Asia. China's definition of its interests in Northeast Asia runs up against those promoted by the US alliance system, and no common political framework exists to encourage Beijing and Washington to adopt definitions that correspond to global rules of proper state conduct. Scholars and policymakers often base their analyses of Northeast Asian strategic uncertainty on the assumption that China applies its grand strategy in Northeast Asia as elsewhere, but that the regional context makes successful implementation difficult. This article instead argues that China has persuaded the international community that Northeast Asia is a region where special rules apply, justifying that Chinese policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula are exempt from the principles of state conduct underpinning China's global grand strategy.
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| 7 |
ID:
088171
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| Publication |
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002.
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| Description |
296p.
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| Standard Number |
075461901X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045959 | 327.51059/ODG 045959 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
151417
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| Summary/Abstract |
The origins and role of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and active defense in Chinese foreign policy are investigated and applied to China’s policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The dominant moderate conceptual strategic thinking encourages Beijing to aim for the establishment of a modus vivendi with Washington and Tokyo that involves a de facto presence of China alongside both the US and Japan. However, Beijing’s signaling is complicated by radical voices that undercut coexistence.
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| 9 |
ID:
186382
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| Summary/Abstract |
NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions.
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| 10 |
ID:
123757
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Diplomatic power and influence, coexistence-style, concerns the ability to determine the framework governing international security management. It requires a programme for international order that devises methods on how to manage the use of force, jurisdiction over peoples and territory and international agreements. China's diplomatic strategy is based on its constitutional concept of peaceful coexistence. This concept has been translated into a programme for order that involves governmental consent, United Nations' (UN) authorisation and approval from regional or functional UN-based organisations as a requirement for using force; effective control and respect for the legal equality of states as a precondition for exercising jurisdiction over peoples and territory; and absolute sovereignty as a basis for the validity of international agreements. The dominant element of Beijing's strategy is coexistence diplomacy, which has allowed China to become a maker of international order.
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| 11 |
ID:
186367
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| Summary/Abstract |
The war in Ukraine has made Russia’s Arctic strategy of developing the Northern Sea Route more important. Moscow and Beijing share interests in redirecting Russian energy and mineral exports towards China and expanding infrastructure along Russia’s Arctic coastline to connect the Northern Sea Route with China’s Polar Silk Road. Chinese investments and technology are necessary to realise the sea route’s commercial potential and protect Russia’s Arctic security interests. Supply lines between North America and Europe traverse the High North. China is supporting a strengthened Russian defence posture by expanding cooperation on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. This will help Russia challenge NATO along both China’s coastline and Russia’s borders with NATO. Accordingly, NATO needs to devise a strategy that recognises the interdependence of its eastern and northern flanks.
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