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| 1 |
ID:
184982
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian armed forces’ lacklustre performance in Ukraine has surprised military analysts. Shortcomings have included breakdowns in logistics, poor equipment and morale, abysmal communications, and muddled command and control, as well as a weak showing by the Russian Aerospace Forces, air defence, and cruise and ballistic missiles. Chief among the contributing factors are wishful political thinking, overreliance on esoteric doctrine and endemic corruption. War, however, brutally exposes peacetime cheating. Consequently, estimates of Russian military capabilities – in particular, for large-formation combined-arms operations, logistics, air defence and intangibles such as morale – need to be carefully reassessed. Earlier analyses of a Russia–NATO conflict appear to have overstated the challenge of defending Europe. Looking ahead, the conventional threat from Russia seems less daunting than previously thought, and the country faces a formidable task in repairing depleted capabilities. That said, President Vladimir Putin’s appetite for risk is greater than anticipated.
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| 2 |
ID:
116654
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Is the world's longest active civil war finally coming to an end? In November 2012 the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began full-fledged peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba. But the mood in Bogotá is ambivalent, with a yearning for peace tempered by a deep-seated distrust of FARC and its negotiating tactics.
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| 3 |
ID:
137423
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With European Union Training Missions (EUTM) Mali and EUTM Somalia, the EU seeks to stabilize countries facing state weakness caused by intrastate conflict. While the EU formally promotes security sector reform (SSR) through its foreign policy, the EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia in one sense can be described as “counter-insurgency by proxy” as military trainees combat local insurgencies shortly upon graduation. This raises the question whether the EUTM missions are consistent with SSR aims, such as creating a security sector that is legitimate, sustainable, and under civilian control, or inadvertently risk contributing to negative side effects in the medium term. Based on extensive interviews in Belgium, Kenya, Mali, Sweden, and Uganda with personnel who either served in or planned these missions, this study analyses factors which hinder the EUTM concept from being fully consistent with SSR and identifies possible policies to ameliorate the risk of unintended side effects.
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| 4 |
ID:
144887
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Rebel involvement in drug trafficking is broadly found to prolong and intensify civil wars. Being an illicit good with strong demand, high profit margins, limited barriers to entry, and few interdiction opportunities, narcotic drugs disproportionately benefit rebel groups as a source of funding in civil wars. Furthermore, drug trafficking is believed to prolong civil wars by creating war economies that benefit rebel groups, making them reluctant to engage in peace negotiations. However, recent peace agreements suggest that drug trafficking can in some cases be used to “buy off” rebel leaders, whereas other insurgents willingly relinquish this source of funding. This article compares attempts at conflict resolution in Colombia and Myanmar, focusing on the impact drug trafficking by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and United Wa State Army has on contemporary peace negotiations.
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| 5 |
ID:
085057
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| 6 |
ID:
076599
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| 7 |
ID:
181193
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Following the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, Western assessments of Russia’s military capabilities rapidly changed from ‘basket case’ to ‘menace’. In this pendulum swing, some estimates clearly overshot, especially concerning Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These were described as creating large no-go zones on NATO’s eastern flank that could be overcome only at high risk or with new, exotic and costly kit. This impression could reinforce perceptions that the eastern allies could not be defended. This article argues that technical limitations, a wide range of possible countermeasures and experiences from air operations in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh together suggest a less alarmist assessment of Russian A2/AD capabilities. But the threat should not be underestimated, and expanded NATO area-access assets are needed, as Russia will continuously improve its capabilities and the status quo is fluid.
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| 8 |
ID:
188456
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| Summary/Abstract |
After Vladimir Putin declared a partial Russian mobilisation in late September 2022 and annexed four additional Ukrainian regions, there was little to suggest that a negotiated settlement would be possible while he remained in power. This article instead explores three possible military outcomes of the war – an outright Ukrainian or Russian military victory, and a war of attrition. As of November 2022, a Ukrainian victory, so unlikely at the outset of Russia’s invasion, is a distinct possibility, provided the West offers sufficient military materiel and training swiftly enough. Russian forces have suffered heavy casualties and are low on precision-guided munitions, with their logistics under fire and having lost much of what air dominance they had. Hence, Moscow’s battlefield fortunes hinge on whether mobilised, poorly trained and equipped forces will be able to hold defensive lines over the winter to buy time to build new, more capable units, with troop morale ever more crucial, but also brittle. A key unknown, however, is the state of Ukrainian forces. Importantly, the scale and intensity of the war, the vital interests at stake and international involvement on both sides all gravitate towards a more drawn-out war over the winter and beyond.
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| 9 |
ID:
086094
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| 10 |
ID:
093926
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While somalia's humanitarian situation remains dire, militant groups are controlling international aid distribution in the country for political and financial ends.
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