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| 1 |
ID:
137846
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the history of Indian defence industry is written, there would be two sure contenders gunning for the title of the most controversial acquisition, viz., the 1984 purchase of the Bofors 155 mm artillery gun and the ongoing, mired in debate, Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) project. The former has outlived its utility as a missile in the political arena while the latter has just begun its journey as a potential one, post the decision of the government to acquire 36 Rafale fighters from France in a government to government (G2G) contract.
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| 2 |
ID:
110994
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Ma Ying-jeou faces a difficult task balancing Beijing's expectations for political negotiations with the Taiwanese electorate's vote for the status quo.
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| 3 |
ID:
142343
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| 4 |
ID:
114799
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000-2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it.
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| 5 |
ID:
091039
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Democratic ProgressiveParty is rebuilding its support among Taiwan's voters after severe defeats in Taiwan's 2008 Legislative Yuan and presidential elections. The process began earlier this year with grassroots efforts such as rallies, a referendum drive, volunteerism and typhoon relief. The party is now developing new policies to attract independent, middle-class and working-class people hit hardest by the economic recession. The first results emerged on Sept. 26, when voters elected the DPP's Liu Chien-kuo to the Legislative Yuan from Yunlin County and defeated a Kuomintang-backed referendum on casinos in Penghu County.
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| 6 |
ID:
124897
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Taking a broader perspective to explore the relations between Taiwan's globalization, social justice issues and the DPP's political and economic nationalism, this study aims to understand the DPP's resurgence in local elections since 2008, and its defeat in the 2012 presidential election. Increasing capital flight from Taiwan to mainland China has contributed to Taiwan's rising unemployment and income inequality. Less privileged Taiwanese, having stronger nationalist sentiments and concerns about the Taiwanese government's open-door China policy, switched their support from the KMT to the DPP during the DPP administration of 2000-2008. Since 2008, the DPP's better balance between its political and economic nationalism has been instrumental in securing popular support, especially at the local level. Nevertheless, in the 2012 presidential election, the DPP failed to convince the majority of Taiwanese voters that its moderate political nationalism could maintain the significantly improved cross-Strait relations vital for Taiwan's economic revival under the current bleak world economic conditions.
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| 7 |
ID:
100655
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| 8 |
ID:
100658
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| 9 |
ID:
134297
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| Summary/Abstract |
In early 2011, the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) government appeared to be in danger of losing power in the upcoming presidential elections. The DPP had recovered sufficiently from its disastrous electoral performance in 2008 to pose a real challenge to Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) and had matched the KMT’s vote share in mid-term local elections. Ma also faced the challenge of an independent presidential candidate, James Soong (Song Chuyu), who had come a close second in 2000 and now threatened to divide the pro KMT vote. Nevertheless, the KMT was able to win reduced majorities in both the presidential and legislative elections in January 2012. This article seeks to explain how the KMT was able to hold on to power by comparing the campaign with earlier national-level elections. We are interested in identifying the degree to which the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minjindang) learnt from its electoral setbacks in 2008 and whether the KMT employed a similar campaign strategy to the one that had been so effective in returning it to power in 2008. Our analysis relies of an examination of campaign propaganda and campaign strategies as well as participant observation and survey data from 2012 and earlier contests.
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| 10 |
ID:
092511
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| 11 |
ID:
076674
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| 12 |
ID:
151986
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| Summary/Abstract |
AMONG THE four traditional geopolitical flash points in East Asia—the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China Seas, and the Taiwan Strait—cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan have been the least likely to generate troubling headlines in recent years. This changed in early December, when President-elect Donald Trump made the controversial decision to take a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen—the first official interaction between a U.S. president or president-elect and Taiwan’s leader since the abrogation of formal ties between both countries in 1979. In an interview shortly afterwards, Trump appeared to question Washington’s future commitment to the “one-China” policy that had guided the U.S. approach to cross-Strait relations for nearly four decades. Trump’s actions sparked a furious reaction from Beijing and set in motion a string of provocative Chinese moves that thrust the frozen conflict over Taiwan back into the international limelight.
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| 13 |
ID:
081867
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After years of escalating tension in the Taiwan Strait, protracted partisan gridlock, and a stagnating economy, the island anxiously awaited a fresh start after the March 2008 presidential election. The election will offer the potential for a dramatic shift in the tone and trajectory of cross-strait relations, and with it the opportunity for decreased risk that the U.S. could be drawn into an armed conflict with China
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| 14 |
ID:
086682
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) won overwhelming victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential elections, leaving the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) demoralized and in disarray. Former President Chen Shui-bian was indicted on corruption charges and jailed pending trial. New President Ma Yingjeou moved quickly to improve relations across the Taiwan Strait, and the long-delayed Three Links (direct air, shipping, and postal service) began in December. Taiwan's economy fared badly along with much of the rest of the world.
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| 15 |
ID:
145434
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2015, Taipei’s relations with Washington moved forward in parallel with the improvements in cross-Strait relations initiated in 2008. Perhaps most notable was President Ma Ying-jeou’s summit meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. Despite gains in external relations, however, the island was plagued by partisan gridlock, a stagnating economy, and political unrest. Most anticipated a Democratic Progressive Party victory over the ruling Kuomintang in the January 2016 presidential election. But few could predict what kind of fallout the election might generate.
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| 16 |
ID:
152249
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| Summary/Abstract |
The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a difficult year for Taiwan’s new ruling party. As 2016 drew to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan’s population disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen’s performance as president.
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| 17 |
ID:
160389
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Tsai Ing-wen has been plagued by controversial domestic issues, and her popularity has fallen significantly. While economic growth in Taiwan has increased, inequality and deteriorating cross-Strait relations have been hard on the ruling party. Tsai needs to work with the new premier, William Ching-te Lai, to regain people’s trust for the local elections in 2018.
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| 18 |
ID:
164949
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party suffered a crushing defeat in local elections in late November. While economic growth remains robust, with GDP per capita rising, the challenge for Tsai is to adjust policy lines and earn support for the coming presidential election.
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| 19 |
ID:
179245
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| Summary/Abstract |
Taiwan saw a series of crucial developments at home and abroad in 2020. Externally, the massive confrontations in Hong Kong were taken as justifying the ruling DPP’s anti-China cross-Strait policy. The impacts of the intense US–China trade war reshaped relations in the US–China–Taiwan triangle. Internally, the results of the 2020 general election strengthened the DPP’s political dominance. Likewise, the successful fight against COVID-19 buttressed the government’s popular support. Still, there are old and new socio-economic issues that will continue to challenge the governing capability of the DPP in 2021.
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| 20 |
ID:
087757
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Social movements constitute a political link between the power of existing polity and the ability of citizens to influence political outcomes. As a result, social movements can represent a potential rival to the acting political system, acquiring power and facilitating change through actions that create threats to existing political structures. In Taiwan, social movements were born from oppression and neglect by the ruling political class of social concerns. Environmental protests were effective in halting further deterioration of the island's environment. How have democracy and its ensuing freedoms for citizens and movements alike altered movement structure and their issues in the socio-political environment? This research traces the development and transformation of the environmental movement in Taiwan within this changing political structure and examines how mobilized protest has been increasingly muted as an effective movement strategy, and how environmental justice has been slow to materialize.
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