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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
096007
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The political roles of Taiwanese business people (taishang) in cross-strait relations have been increasingly noteworthy under Hu Jintao's policy of "counting on the Taiwanese people." But contrary to widely accepted allegations, this paper argues that attempts by China to use Taiwanese business people as a means to gain political leverage over Taiwan will probably not pan out as a successful strategy.
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| 2 |
ID:
190383
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, Party leaders have expressed concern about “bureaucratic slack,” or shirking, by local government officials. This article investigates the reasons for the emergence of bureaucratic slack in China’s political system. It verifies two popular hypotheses, namely, reduced material inducements and increased risk. Using a unique national survey of 1,789 local cadres, we confirm both hypotheses. Our survey also reveals differences across groups of local cadres. We find bureaucratic slack among lower-ranked cadres to be caused mainly by the lack of material inducements, while higher-ranked officials are more discouraged by increased risks. We conducted follow-up fieldwork to examine in greater depth why each cohort responded differently to the Xi administration’s administrative reforms and anticorruption drives.
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| 3 |
ID:
192629
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can China develop so quickly and yet maintain stability? Most scholars pinpoint the efforts of China's local government leaders as a primary factor. Regarding what motivates these leaders, however, scholars display wide disagreement. The widely accepted “promotion tournament” hypothesis stresses competition among local leaders as the driving force, but empirical test results vary considerably and create controversy. We argue that tests of promotion competition should target leadership behaviour rather than institutional inducements; the latter are, at best, a necessary condition of the former. Informed by extensive fieldwork, this study proposes an alternative and more direct approach to verifying the promotion tournament hypothesis by examining the impacts of promotion competition on leaders’ performance efforts. Our test results show, however, that competition for promotion has no significant impact on local leaders’ behaviour, thereby indicating that the promotion tournament hypothesis cannot be the primary explanation for China's economic achievements and regime resilience. In so doing, our study illuminates the oversimplified assumptions behind a prevailing proposition in Chinese politics and offers empirically informed insights into the tensions between political institutions and leadership behaviour.
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| 4 |
ID:
192105
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| Summary/Abstract |
In China, too many leadership positions are assigned to the same broad administrative levels, creating difficulty in distinguishing their specific political rankings. Pinpointing their exact political significance, this study proposes an index using the common joint appointments of party and government positions in the Chinese Nomenklatura. After coming up with the index, to demonstrate applicability, this article uses it first to assess China’s provincial-level positions and then extend it down to prefecture-level and up to Central ministerial positions. The authors believe that this new index enables better observation and interpretation of China’s leadership transfers and, consequently, improves researchers’ understanding of the prospects of Chinese politicians and the dynamics of the Chinese polity.
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| 5 |
ID:
076675
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| 6 |
ID:
156605
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's trade with Taiwan has a political motive: winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. The effectiveness of China's economic statecraft can be examined in the Syuejia (Xuejia) case, where Taiwan put up strong resistance to the generous benefits offered by China. This article investigates the political implications of the Chinese-designed contract farming programme in Syuejia and argues that if economic favours are delivered, and positive impressions also created, political attitudes can be revised. Without these two prerequisites, however, replicating the Syuejia results elsewhere and thus disturbing the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult. When put in a theoretical context, the changes in the political landscape of Syuejia illustrate the interplay of economic interests and political identity.
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