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ID:
046477
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| Publication |
Washington, D C, Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
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| Description |
ix, 142p.
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| Standard Number |
0815735650
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045258 | 353.1/HER 045258 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
076716
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The decisions to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Taiwan represent two of the most important cases of nuclear rollback during the Cold War. The cases differ in significant ways: While Taiwan's rollback emphasized capability reductions, South Korea's nuclear rollback mainly reflected changes in intent. One similarity was that despite their precarious security environment, both reversed their nuclear programs in the face of tremendous U.S. pressure. The United States is likely to remain central to these states' future nuclear narratives to ensure that they do not restart their programs. Changes in the threat environment, shifts in relations with the United States, or the belief that no one is watching could produce worrisome policy shifts in Seoul and Taipei. Several key questions for examination include: Why did they suspend their nuclear weapons programs? What specific pressures influenced rollback? How important was Washington in the process? How significant were the reversals? What could induce them to restart the programs? Understanding Seoul's and Taipei's decision-making is crucial to understanding rollback writ large. Failure to do so may invite an era in which the long-feared "nuclear dominoes" may fall
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