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ID:
157934
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| Summary/Abstract |
The principle of universal jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over a category of cases when the state has no connection by territory, nationality, or other interest with the parties. While the concept of universal jurisdiction is not new, it has been almost exclusively applied to criminal matters. There has been relatively little focus on the application of universal jurisdiction in the civil sphere as a means for victims to seek judgments and compensation for serious violations of human rights. This article examines the theoretical distinction made by courts in the application of universal jurisdiction to civil cases and explores why the emerging norm of universal jurisdiction has been focused almost exclusively on criminal matters. The article surveys the status of universal civil jurisdiction in US and European courts, examines how jurisdiction is limited by courts, and assesses the arguments for and against a civil basis of universal jurisdiction.
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| 2 |
ID:
076729
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the influence that state finance has had on the Romanian party system by examining the entry and exit of parties throughout the period of 1990 - 2004 and focusing on the number of parties that gained representation in the parliament as well as the party incumbency rate. I find that state finance has had a limited influence on the party system as a whole but has been influential for specific parties. I argue that the influence of state finance partly depends on when the system was introduced. In developing party systems, the influence of state finance on individual parties is more differential.
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| 3 |
ID:
076883
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We investigate why states provide a voluntary contribution to war crimes tribunals despite the fact that these tribunals are located in states that offer few economic and strategic advantages. We view tribunal financing as a form of foreign assistance and place the funding of tribunals within the broader foreign assistance literature to explain the motivations of donor states. We examine voluntary contributions to four tribunals, and our analysis shows that there are differences between the gatekeeper stage and the secondary decision to allocate assistance. However, donors generally make no distinction among tribunals for purposes of foreign assistance. As a consequence, purely voluntarily funded tribunals are at a disadvantage, since they are not seen by states as unique and requiring special consideration. Ultimately, the lack of funding calls into question the ability of these tribunals to provide justice to victims as well as serve as a mechanism for national reconciliation.
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