|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
076769
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay analyzes the regional and global implications of different enlargement formulations of the European Union (EU) during the first half of the twenty-first century by (1) assessing the consequences of expanded EU membership with varying enlargement scenarios regarding global power distributions, (2) considering the implications of a drift between the United States and the EU as China reaches parity with the West, and (3) examining the implications of EU enlargement for regional stability in the Middle East as a consequence of Turkey's entry into or rejection by the EU. The findings reaffirm earlier results that China is expected to reach parity with the United States in 2025-2030 and move ahead to be the largest economy in the world. The results for the EU show that, regardless of its enlargement plans, it will fall behind the other giants, becoming the third largest economy. Part of the expected decline in its GDP share can be offset by adding Turkey, and perhaps Russia, to the Union. We also find that Turkey's inclusion into the EU will bring stability to the Middle East. Moreover, we observe that the relationship between Iran and Turkey is one with a high probability of conflict and that it will intensify very quickly over time. With Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, this dyad is likely to become more conflictual before Iran establishes clear superiority. Turkey's membership in the EU would remove Iran's growing challenge to the volatile Middle East. With Turkey in the EU, parity between Iran and Turkey would disappear and Iran could no longer project hostility against the latter.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
076770
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay explores the deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma in extended deterrence in the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. Our most significant simplification concerns Defender's type. In particular, we assume that Defender, although not heavily invested in the issues in dispute, is known to prefer conflict to the breakup of its strategic relationship with Protégé. One important result concerns unequivocal commitments. We find that such commitments are efficacious but only when Protégé's threat to sever its relationship with Defender is highly credible. In the absence of this condition, a straddle (or mixed) strategy is optimal for Defender. A straddle strategy, which involves probabilistic support of Protégé, is the mechanism by which Defender attempts to resolve the deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma. Sometimes, the stratagem works and Challenger is deterred and Protégé is restrained. But a straddle strategy will always fail to deter determined Challengers, such as Germany in 1914, that prefer to fight rather than back down during a confrontation. It may even fail to deter hesitant Challengers with an aversion to conflict. We use these insights to explain and evaluate British policy in the runup to World War I.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
076766
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The United States, by concentrating its intellectual, diplomatic, and military energy on the Middle East, is neglecting the far more substantial long-range challenges that will arise in Asia by mid-century. This strategic myopia is magnified by the lack of a clear national strategy, one that should be focused on recognizing the full implications of the rise of China and India into the ranks of great powers. Informed by theoretical arguments and offering policy options, this essay examines the coming Asian challenge against the backdrop of a world with three great powers potentially competing for resources, allies, and leadership within Asia and, more broadly, the international system
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
076767
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay evaluates the implications of international political development on demographic transitions and economic outcomes from 1980 to 2050. Countries with high levels of political capacity experience the sharpest declines in birth and death rates as well as the greatest gains in income. Politics indirectly and directly affects the environment within which individuals make decisions about the size of families; these decisions, in turn, change the future economic dynamics of a country. We find that political capacity ensures that rules are evenly applied, allowing investment for long-term gain. Our projections show that under conditions of high political capacity, anticipated demographic and economic transformations will allow China to supersede the dominance of the United States by the end of this century and will also enable the rise of India into the ranks of the dominant powers. We assess the consequences of these changes in world politics
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
076768
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Political capacity is a necessary condition for the growth and rise of any leading nation. History has witnessed the augmentation and decline of great powers concomitant with the ebbs and flows of their political capacity. This essay reviews the concept of political capacity and discusses the measure of relative political capacity. It further applies the concept and measure of such capacity to China where building government capacity seems to dovetail with the nation's policy priorities. China's political capacity decreases when economic reforms are the driving force and increases when political campaigns carry the day. Finally, a cross-province analysis of political capacity is conducted revealing that provinces located in the central part of China tend to have stronger governments than are found in other areas. This finding is consistent with the observation of historians that thousands of years of meteorological and geographic forces have shaped state-building in Central China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|