| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
082597
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| 2 |
ID:
105627
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| 3 |
ID:
076772
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the nuclear weapons scientific and policymaking community. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime, or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. Developing a nuclear fingerprint database is also discussed. While useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.
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| 4 |
ID:
103707
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Richard Weitz looks at the international politics of nuclear forensics-a scientific technique that employs various investigatory methods to reveal the source and history of nuclear material. He worries that many governments and analysts underestimate the difficulties in constructing an effective nuclear forensics regime that can pinpoint those responsible for a nuclear incident and thus weakens the ability to deter by threatening nuclear retaliation.
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| 5 |
ID:
126792
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013.
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| Description |
148p.Pbk
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| Series |
IDSA Monograph Series No.27
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| Standard Number |
9789382169277
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057535 | 363.32/KAZ 057535 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 057536 | 363.32/KAZ 057536 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
129742
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of the nuclear security regime is to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events (e.g. illicit trafficking of nuclear material or a nuclear terrorism attack). Nuclear forensic analysis is a key technical capability that utilises signatures inherent to nuclear or other radioactive material to provide information on its source, production and history. It can be used as part of the response to the nuclear security event, as well as to help prevent it. Section I of this article will introduce the basic information about nuclear forensic analysis. Section II, which constitutes the main body of the article, will describe in detail how the process of nuclear forensic analysis works in case of a nuclear security event investigation, and provide examples to illustrate specific points. Section III will conclude the article by discussing how nuclear forensics can be utilised not just for a post-event investigation but also for prevention of nuclear security events.
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