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ID:
093709
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2009.
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| Description |
xv, 248p.
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| Series |
Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series; 14
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| Standard Number |
9780415447447
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054735 | 355.30947/PAL 054735 | Main | Withdrawn | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
076793
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The frequent claim that the "power ministries," "siloviki" or "chekisty," decide just about everything in Russian politics and the tendency to demonize this sphere detract attention from the real problems. The power ministries are not a homogenous group and Putin would never give the FSB or any other institution the opportunity to "take over" Russian politics. Instead, the dilemma that faces the Kremlin and Russian society at large is the fact that the power ministries have never been subject to scrutiny. Incompetence, abuse of power and sheer inefficiency can thus thrive in this sector. Even more problematic is the Kremlin's compulsion to control everything - often with the help of the power ministries. This is, of course, damaging from a democratic perspective, but Putin ought to be concerned even from a purely Machiavellian point of view. By gathering all strings of control to the Kremlin, Putin has lost the alternative sources of scrutiny such as an independent press, judiciary and parliament.
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| 3 |
ID:
089335
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian military operation during the Five-Day war in Georgia points to a number of lessons with strategic implications for Russia. The deficiencies in its military performance - not least concerning C4ISR and precision strike capability - have underscored the need for a modernization of the Armed Forces and a diversification of Russia's military capability. Russia needs to arrive at a strategic decision on the priorities for the future development of its military and defence industry: should it prepare for large-scale wars or post-modern warfare and counter-insurgence? In the meantime, the scope of Russian military strategy will be clearly limited and military force will remain a powerful but blunt security policy instrument.
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