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| 1 |
ID:
076898
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| 2 |
ID:
108467
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of this study is to answer the question of whether the European Union (EU) has treated Turkey and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) differently with regard to financial assistance based on the EU's financial assistance system. To this end, financial assistance provided to Turkey and the CEECs has been compared both quantitatively and qualitatively. The aim of demonstrating the difference is to show Turkey's place in the financial assistance system, how to interpret financial assistance planned to be granted to Turkey under financial perspective and to ensure better interpretation of the results from financial assistance provided in the period of 1963-2006.
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| 3 |
ID:
128390
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The financial assistance of Iranian authorities to the President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai in October 2010, has once again sparked the discussion on Iranian policy towards Afghanistan. The fable of "money envelopes" which was delivered by Islamic Republic of Iran by non- diplomatic means remains a hot topic both inside and outside Afghanistan. llamid Karzai confirmed at a press conference that his chief of office receives cash between five to seven hundred thousand Euros: twice each year from Iran. Though the President of Afghanistan clari?ed that this controversial so called financial aid has been part of the' international financial support in which Iran is involved in the post- Taliban reconstruction of Afghanistan, his reply could not convince the- analysts who are experts on Iran and Afghanistan policies. The main reason that the issue became controversial has been theonedia propaganda related to this issue in which Iran is accused of providing military aid and financial support to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The seizure of two thousand oil tankers by Iranian government which resul - _ in a large anti-Iranian demonstration in Kabul against the Iran emba _ highlighted the issue. Few months before, in March 2010, Irani President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad during his visit to Kabul emphas' - y. Iran's disagreement over the presence of NATO in Afghanistan. He sai to regional peace."
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| 4 |
ID:
128249
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although scholars have made great progress over the last few years studying the international dimension of democratisation, questions remain about this complex relationship, especially about the understudied area of external promotion of authoritarianism. This article seeks to develop more refined understanding of specific mechanisms linking one type of external involvement, financial assistance, to regime change. Financial assistance can increase the capabilities of either pro-democratic or pro-authoritarian elites and therefore contribute to regime change. These mechanisms are examined by looking at democracy assistance in Slovakia and Belarus and Russia's support for authoritarianism in Belarus.
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| 5 |
ID:
132127
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2014.
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In April 2013, Ukraine was sporting a massive current account deficit of eight percent, and it badly needed dollars to pay for vital imports. Yet on April 10, President Viktor Yanukovych's government rejected terms set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $15 billion financial assistance package, choosing instead to continue financing the gap between its domestic production and its much higher consumption by borrowing dollars privately from abroad. So a week later, Kiev issued a ten-year, $1.25 billion eurobond, which cash-flush foreign investors gobbled up at a 7.5 percent yield.
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| 6 |
ID:
120903
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The turmoil associated with the Arab Spring in the region's eight monarchies has received comparatively modest attention because, aside from Bahrain, the demonstrations were mostly small and nonconfrontational, there were few calls to overthrow the regimes, and states' coercive powers were applied with relative moderation. Behind these generalizations, however, lies a more complex reality: the extent of the strife was quite different, as were state actions to counter them across the eight cases. What explains these disparities? This essay argues that the differences in the levels of unrest are largely illuminated by varying degrees of societal support for monarchical regimes, deep-seated societal cleavages, and the deficiencies of political mobilization. The variation in state responses, in turn, is mainly explained by divergent financial resources, the quality of political leadership, and external diplomatic, financial, and security assistance.
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| 7 |
ID:
104306
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given its impressive economic performance over the past two decades, Ireland earned the title, the 'Celtic Tiger'. However, as the contagion from the subprime-induced global financial crisis spread, Ireland's boom went bust. In short order, Ireland (like Greece before it), had to seek financial assistance from the EU and the IMF to stave off sovereign default and national humiliation. How did Dublin and the eurozone respond to the crisis and what lessons can be learned from Ireland's experience? While Ireland grapples with its huge public debt, the EU needs to instill confidence in the markets before the current rolling debt crisis becomes a systemic threat to the eurozone.
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