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PFIFFNER, JAMES P
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
076913
Marching in time: alliance politics, synchrony and the case for
/ Doig, Alan; Pfiffner, James P; Phythian, Mark; Tiffen, Rodney
Doig, Alan
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2007.
Summary/Abstract
This article considers how three countries - the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia - approached the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by examining how the leaders' decision-making interacted, the commonalities of their policy-making processes, and the approach to policy justification taken in terms of their domestic political environments. In particular, it examines the extent to which their claims as to why invasion was necessary went in synchrony. Having decided on war, all three national leaders sought to persuade their publics of the moral imperative for invasion and the immediacy of the threat that needed to be eradicated, and each made secret intelligence public in so doing. The selective use of intelligence allowed the politial leaders to shift the focus of the blame from policy-makers to intelligence accuracy when the immediate threat from weapons of mass destruction turned out to be illusory
Key Words
WMD
;
United States
;
Iraq War
;
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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2
ID:
094455
US blunders in Iraq: de-baathification and disbanding the army
/ Pfiffner, James P
Pfiffner, James P
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2010.
Summary/Abstract
In May 2003 Paul Bremer issued CPA Orders to exclude from the new Iraq government members of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and to disband the Iraqi Army (CPA Order 2). These two orders severely undermined the capacity of the occupying forces to maintain security and continue the ordinary functioning of the Iraq government. The decisions reversed previous National Security Council judgments and were made over the objections of high ranking military and intelligence officers. The article concludes that the most likely decision maker was the Vice President.
Key Words
Security
;
Army
;
Military
;
Iraq
;
United States
;
Iraqi Army
;
De - Baathification
;
Baath Party
;
National Security Council Judgments
;
Intelligence Officers
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