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| 1 |
ID:
130388
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| 2 |
ID:
126676
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay describes the piracy that took place in the Mediterranean from the time of ancient Greece to Barbary. It explains the corso, the sea war between nonstate but state-endorsed Christian and Muslim parties, with reference to the Knights of Malta and, more extensively, the Barbary corsairs. Although the essay focuses primarily on history, it also draws some conclusions about piracy and the international system today. The essay notes a prevailing assumption that contemporary piracy off Somalia and that perpetrated by the Barbary pirates is similar, but it further notes that any similarities are slight and superficial. At the same time, similarities rooted in economic, social, and political change do exist between all outbreaks of depredation at sea and the responses to them.
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| 3 |
ID:
076971
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| 4 |
ID:
097174
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| 5 |
ID:
146362
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| Summary/Abstract |
Geography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Britain and later the United States employed a distinctive form of sea power to defeat their adversaries. Both used their navies to control sea-lanes and vital choke points and to apply direct pressure along enemy coastlines. Through their dominance of the oceans they were able to shape the political and economic order of the world. It is fair to say that what amounts to the Anglo-American school of naval power has demonstrated its efficacy time after time: over the past 250 years these two powers have, singly or together, and always with other allies, defeated every opponent that has attempted to change that order
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| 6 |
ID:
128667
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author, a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and vising fellow at the Corbett centre for Maritime Policy studies, King's college, London, examines the idea of cooperation between the Anglophone navies to compensate for the declining strength of each of theme individually. He looks beyond comforting language about cooperation to what it might mean on the ground in real in real material terms. An earlier version of this article was published by the Atlantic Council and Rusi in September 2012.
In the unrelenting struggle of peoples, those ascendant at sea have, at least in the modern era, proved consistently successful either singly or in alliance against those with a territorial power base- Peter Padfield.
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| 7 |
ID:
123667
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
West Africa piracy is the most profitable in the world. Well-organized gangs steal refined oil in contrast to Somali pirates who hold crews and ships for ransom. Like piracy elsewhere, the origins and potential solutions to West African piracy are found ashore-largely in Nigeria. This article argues that oil states in the developing world are shielded from the domestic and international pressures that can bring down their non-oil neighbors. The current international system which makes international recognition, not internal legitimacy or functionality, the key to state authority works to their benefit. It encourages those parts which are valuable to industrialized powers-and to the domestic elites who facilitate and benefit from international legitimization-to function well enough for resource extraction to continue. The security of the state generally matters less than the security of key enclaves- including ships and offshore platforms-which support elite interests.
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| 8 |
ID:
114373
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| 9 |
ID:
078826
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| 10 |
ID:
137941
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the economic rise of powers such as China that wish to reinterpret the global order underpinning trade and international law, there is renewed requirement for Western navies to think about how maritime power can contribute to the protection of commerce in the twenty-first century. In this article, Martin N Murphy explores the intersection that is now evident between economic, financial and maritime warfare, assessing how maritime power can once again be used in the exploitation of economic and financial weakness.
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