| Summary/Abstract |
Is unipolarity durable? IR scholars have offered contradictory answers, with primacists arguing for the longevity of US unipolarity and declinists suggesting the opposite. The literature suffers, however, from two shortcomings: (1) theories of unipolarity built on the sole case of the United States are difficult to generalize; and (2) they tend to focus on the defensive measures available to lesser states while downplaying the proactive means the unipole can adopt to prolong its dominance. To remedy these weaknesses, I propose a model of strategic interaction and apply it to two cases of unipolarity in East Asian history, Ming China (1368–1644) and Qing China (1644–1912). I argue that unipolar durability is an outcome of strategic interactions between the unipole’s proactive measures to sustain its asymmetric power advantage and the potential challenger’s ability to increase its power without drawing the unipole’s military containment. Unipolar durability is contingent, not preordained.
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