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| 1 |
ID:
185492
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| Summary/Abstract |
All major research programs that study technological change find common ground in emphasizing the explanatory significance of domestic institutions in determining national innovation rates. And yet, after decades of research, this domestic-centered approach has yet to identify any particular set of institutions or policies that explain variation in innovative performance over time and across cases. Recently, a new research program has emerged which argues that this bottleneck to theory development is due to a critical omitted variable bias: international security. This article probes one facet of this argument by examining the relationship between international threat environments and national innovation rates. The regression results show a positive effect of threats on national innovation, a finding that is robust across different specifications and periods of analysis. Additionally, unlike previous studies that find no significant relationship between security alliances and military innovation, the opposite is true of threat: states faced with high external threat environments tend to innovate at the defense technology frontier.
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| 2 |
ID:
077050
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| 3 |
ID:
175664
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we review the International Relations literature and derive from it certain expectations of how government centralization may affect threat assessment, and from these, generate formal hypotheses. We then test these against the evidence of the extensive structural changes within Japan’s national security apparatus and the government’s threat perception in the period spanning the first and second Abe administrations (2006–2018). Drawing from official government documents, we find marked change to certain metrics of Japan’s threat assessment beginning in 2013, the first full year of the second (and current) Abe Administration. We argue that political instrumentality, and in particular, Abe’s policy agenda of breaking the constitutional status quo and resolving the territorial dispute with Russia, were paramount in shaping official threat assessment during this period (2012–2018). Our findings lend evidence to both the scholarships on threat perception and government centralization, as well as to the debate of Abe’s legacy in Japan’s post-war security policy.
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