| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
078723
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| 2 |
ID:
077360
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| 3 |
ID:
077823
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| 4 |
ID:
078759
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| 5 |
ID:
077477
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| 6 |
ID:
085363
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| Publication |
London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.
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| Description |
99p.
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| Series |
Adelphi paper; 398
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| Standard Number |
9780415466547
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054075 | 355.82511909581/FIT 054075 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
079569
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| 8 |
ID:
078015
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| 9 |
ID:
094117
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| 10 |
ID:
078136
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| 11 |
ID:
077286
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| 12 |
ID:
077373
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| 13 |
ID:
084093
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Strategic culture is an amalgam of a country's set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and narratives that shape its strategic decision-making process. This article evaluates Iran's evident pursuit of nuclear weapons in light of four key elements of its strategic culture as an attempt to ascertain Iran's goals for developing these weapons. These four elements include: (1) an all-encompassing conviction in Shia Islam as the bedrock of the regime's political legitimacy and the country's national identity; (2) a hypernationalistic belief in Iran's rightful place as the leader of the Islamic civilization and as a regional hegemon; (3) a pervasive sense of external and internal vulnerability; and (4) an ingrained perception that the U.S. desires to dominate and eventually destroy the Islamic civilization. The evaluation of these elements strongly augurs that a nuclear-armed Iran is not likely to employ these weapons offensively due to its fear of retaliation and the constraining interests within its regime's political structure. Rather, its drive toward a nuclear-weapons capability is to provide Iran with a defensive deterrent that will advance its desires for regional hegemony and mitigate its pervasive sense of insecurity.
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| 14 |
ID:
077101
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does Israel have the ability to conduct a military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities similar to its 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor? The Israeli Air Force has significantly upgraded its equipment since the early 1980s, but the Iranian nuclear complex is a much harder target than was the Osirak reactor. Iran has three facilities that are critical for nuclear weapons production: a uranium conversion facility, an enrichment facility, and a heavy-water production plant and associated plutonium production reactor. This article analyzes possible interactions of Israel's improved air force, including the addition of F-15I aircraft and U.S.-supplied conventional "bunker-buster" precision-guided munitions, with the Iranian target set and air defense systems. It concludes that Israel has the capability to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure with at least as much confidence as it had in the 1981 Osirak strike. Beyond the case of Iran, this finding has implications for the use of precision-guided weapons as a counterproliferation tool. Precision-guided weapons confer the ability to reliably attack hard and deeply buried targets with conventional, rather than nuclear, weapons. Intelligence on the location of nuclear sites is thus the primary limiting factor of military counterproliferation
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| 15 |
ID:
052372
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| Publication |
Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2001.
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| Description |
xi, 79p.
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| Series |
McNair papers
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044937 | 355.8251190955/SCH 044937 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 045740 | 355.8251190955/SCH 045740 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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