| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
139123
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| 2 |
ID:
118465
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| 3 |
ID:
127873
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| 4 |
ID:
127875
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| 5 |
ID:
109542
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| 6 |
ID:
117109
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| 7 |
ID:
117110
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| 8 |
ID:
124415
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Canada's first fighting season in Kandahar was traumatic. More than 40 soldiers were killed and several hundred injured. The unexpected strength of the insurgents' offensive was, in the Canadian experience, made worse by the extremely disappointing performance of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Improving the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces soon became an urgent concern and possible exit strategy. Part of Canada's answer was the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), which consisted of small groups of soldiers working side by side with Afghan forces to build their capability. This paper, based on interviews with former OMLT mentors, examines the origins and expansion of the Canadian OMLT, and offers an initial assessment of its impact.
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| 9 |
ID:
077137
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called 'Afghan National Army' run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a 'national' army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a 'national' army.
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| 10 |
ID:
102859
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| 11 |
ID:
129431
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| 12 |
ID:
097686
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| 13 |
ID:
119295
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| 14 |
ID:
126297
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| 15 |
ID:
109771
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does Pakistan figure in the face-saving deal that the US is trying to thrash out with the Taliban in Doha?
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| 16 |
ID:
130102
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| 17 |
ID:
108369
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| 18 |
ID:
114424
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Afghan National Army is going to be a key player in the country's transition after 2014. Historical experience, however, has shown time and again that the ANA could equally become a force for stability or a strong element of destabilisation. If the ANA is to make a positive contribution to the future of the country, it needs to be internally cohesive and avoid disintegration along sectarian or class lines. Jason Wood analyses the many threats to cohesion and explores how the ANA can implement a variety of mechanisms to ensure that these obstacles are overcome.
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| 19 |
ID:
119293
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| 20 |
ID:
084892
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper attempts to examine diverse challenges to the making of the new Afghan National Army (ANA), and its future prospects. The issue assumes significance as the Taliban shift battle lines outside the Pashtun areas and there is growing difference among Western countries regarding the means and approaches to be used to stabilize Afghanistan. The paper is broadly divided into four sections. The first section seeks to identify and critically examine the role played by key institutional structures responsible for the training and mentoring of the new national army. The second section deals with the challenges confronting Afghanistan which have a bearing on the development of the ANA as an effective force. The third section explores the dilemmas confronting the West, and the final section offers key assessments on the ANA's future prospects.
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