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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
092536
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the underpricing of IPOs in the Chinese A-share market during the period 1992-2006. Since its inception, the Chinese IPO market has transformed from a tightly-controlled system to a more market-oriented system. Reforms include the abolishment of listing quotas and fixed issue price determination; allowing for more market participation in IPO pricing. The regulatory changes of Chinese IPO market, though improving over time, actually are not monotonic. The regulatory framework started from over-restrictive to over-unrestrictive, then fine-tuned with additional restrictions. This study documents the regulatory reforms during the sample period and investigates how these regulatory changes affect IPO underpricing in China. During this period, we find that Chinese IPOs exhibit a huge underpricing. The size of the underpricing, however, decreases over the sample period. This study further finds that the IPO pricing method before the regulatory changes, which was based on a fixed P/E ratio pre-determined by the regulators, contributed significantly to the IPO underpricing in China. After adopting a series of regulatory reforms allowing underwriters discretion in the determination of issue price, this regulatory underpricing component vanishes. This study has policy implications in demonstrating the impacts of regulatory frameworks on IPO underpricing.
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| 2 |
ID:
077188
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Four new determinants of initial/long-run IPO (initial public offering) returns from the perspectives of market conditions are proposed in this paper. The associated effects are examined by using the samples of Taiwan's high-tech IPO companies. Our empirical findings are consistent with the following notions. First, the four new determinants proposed perform remarkable effects on the IPO returns. Second, the length for IPO and IPO clustering phenomena has notable impacts on the long-run returns of IPO. In contrast, the performances of public stock markets show significant effects on the initial returns of IPO
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| 3 |
ID:
143435
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using hand-collected data on IPOs by private-owned enterprises, this article examines the regulatory benefits of political connections in China's state-controlled going public process, a subject that has rarely been investigated in existing literature. This article makes the following findings: first, political connections have significant positive impact on enterprises' chances of being approved for IPOs; second, enterprises with political connections are significantly more likely to receive preferential treatments (e.g., higher offering price-to-earning ratio) from regulatory authorities; third, enterprises with political connections are significantly less likely to be selected for pre-IPO on-site auditing by regulatory authorities. The findings of this article may provide answer to the question why China has been so reluctant to adopt disclosure-based regulatory regime as well as insights into the puzzle of the consistent poor performance of China's stock markets.
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| 4 |
ID:
143416
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we empirically examine how government forces vis-à-vis market forces have affected the market share of investment banks in Chinese domestic IPOs over the period 1995–2010. Before 2005, only political connections significantly positively influenced the market share of investment banks. After 2005, the effect of political connections declined, while a low evaluation standard on IPO candidates and low underwriting fees now also significantly enhance market share. We explain these findings by the pro-competitive, yet partial changes that were introduced in the regulatory framework for IPOs, thereby emphasizing the need for a delicate policy coordination in marketization reforms.
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