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| 1 |
ID:
126774
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The challenge presented by china's military modernization has seemingly altered the conventional balance in the western pacific, with significant implications for U.S. national security policy, and, thus, deserves the focus of planners and decision-makers.
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| 2 |
ID:
116566
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China has brought forth new sets of opportunities and challenges for Southeast Asia. A new politico-strategic landscape has emerged in which, ASEAN not only seeks China's economic support perceived to be crucial for the development of the region, but also worries about China's growing power and the possibility of Chinese domination over the region. ASEAN as a regional interlocutor has responded to the new phenomenon by deploying a hedging strategy that seeks to benefit from the opportunities and manage the challenges emanating from the rise of China. While ASEAN's policy of 'honest brokerage' has allowed the presence of other powers to balance China, its policy of enmesh China has facilitated China's role as a stakeholder in the ASEAN cooperative processes.
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| 3 |
ID:
132005
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons status or political distrust among other powers may increase the number of Asian nuclear weapons states (including states with prospective nuclear-missile reach into Asia) to eight, creating an Asian-Middle Eastern nuclear arms race that defies containment. On the other hand, an alternative presents itself, in the form of a multilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement that would create three tiers of accepted nuclear weapons states and bar the door to new admits.
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| 4 |
ID:
152276
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is a growing concern that China has become more assertive in its foreign policies. The fear is whether China’s economic growth may translate into modern and effective military advancement. This engenders the critical question of whether China feels comfortable in the current international order, which is defined by international law and institutions. This article argues that the Chinese approach to international law and institutions is tightly associated with its evolving perception of sovereignty, and national interests vis-à-vis international law and institutions, and is characterised by a love–hate attitude towards them. With its opening up, China now views multilateralism as a way for the international community to constrain the capriciousness of a superpower, and regards the international institutions simply as power-sharing development. However, China’s integration in international institutions represents its attempt to work within international norms to pursue its interests. China’s ambivalence towards international judicial settlement of disputes signals the historical legacy as well as China’s uneasiness with playing an active role in international institution-building and rule-making.
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| 5 |
ID:
131999
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
What is China's international identity? How has it changed over time, especially since the reform and opening up of the country in the late 1970s? How does China see itself? And how do other countries see China? I argue that answers to these questions are instrumental to a proper understanding of Chinese foreign-policy behaviour, in ways more significant than we normally assume. To advance this argument, I choose to examine China's social interactions with the outside world to ascertain the evolution of its international identity/identities. I shall trace the domestic sources of China's external policies. In so doing, I hope this article will elucidate the 'debates' between social constructivism and realism as to their relative explanatory power with respect to the making of Chinese international identity. I also hope it will throw light on a possible alternative framework, known as social evolution, for studying China's international relations and its evolving identities.
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| 6 |
ID:
125511
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most dramatic events in the twenty first century Asia, as it is turning out has been the rise of People's Republic of China (henceforth China). Equally dramatic has been the ongoing reform process and opening up of Myanmar to the outside world. Intriguingly enough, the China-Myanmar bilateral relationship has also been full of surprises, drawing the attention of policy makers and foreign policy pundits alike.
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| 7 |
ID:
131065
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the next twenty years China is likely to become the world's largest national economy, though not the richest one-fifth of the world's population. Chinese demographic power will be qualitatively different from American technological power despite bottom-line similarities in GNP, and China will face challenges of political and economic sustainability. Assuming that globalization, constrained state sovereignty, and demographic revolution continue as basic world trends, the world order is likely to be one in which concerns about conflicts of interests drive interactions, but no state or group of states is capable of benefitting from unilaterally enforcing its will against the rest. Thus, there is no set of "poles" whose competition or cooperation determines the world order, despite the differences of exposure created by disparities in capacity. Although the United States and China will be the primary state actors and their relationship will contain elements of rivalry as well as cooperation, the prerequisites of Cold War bipolarity no longer exist. Rather, the order would be best described as "multinodal," a matrix of interacting, unequal units that pursue their own interests within a stable array of national units and an increasing routinization of international regimes and interpenetrating transnational connections
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| 8 |
ID:
130586
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The prevailing discourse on the Chinese state and its state enterprises is dominated by the application of Western political and economic concepts to China. These concepts ignore China's cultural and political history in which the state plays a major role and is embedded in Chinese society, as well as the role of numerous reform experiments during China's economic transition from a command to a socialist market economy. As a result, most assessments of Chinese state enterprises are unbalanced. The preoccupation with a state-private dichotomy has also led to the failure of recognising the emergence of a distinct corporate entity
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| 9 |
ID:
109309
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| 10 |
ID:
130164
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper provides a critical overview of Australian, Chinese, and American perspectives on trilatesralim, with a detailed discussion of Australian debates on the matter. Its aim is to trace the evolution of the changing discourse on the rise of China, examine major debates in Australia, and provide both an intellectual background and an overview for this special issue.
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| 11 |
ID:
153025
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| Summary/Abstract |
How a rising power adapts to its new status is an important challenge in international relations. Since the global financial crisis, Chinese scholars have hotly debated China’s international positioning. The ongoing debate reveals a high level of uncertainty about China’s position in the world. While the notion of the ‘revival of the Chinese nation’ implies the clear goal of ‘making China great again’, China’s ultimate place on the global stage is unclear. Many Chinese scholars might want China to become richer and stronger, but disagree on whether or not China should eventually seek superpower status. Regarding strategies, Chinese scholars also debate whether China should maintain a low profile or strive for greater achievements in global affairs. This article takes a ‘status signalling’ approach to explain why Chinese scholars take various positions in this debate. Status signalling aims either to change or maintain a special type of ‘status belief’ among relevant political actors. China must manage its conflicting roles in ways that advance its interests but do not engender dangerous misperceptions. In particular, China must balance the competing incentives between resolve and reassurance, status and responsibilities, and the domestic and international audience. These competing incentives have shaped the Chinese debate on international positioning.
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| 12 |
ID:
159605
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| 13 |
ID:
125506
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The India-China border dispute has been subject of much debate, discussion, and analysis over since the Sino-Indian war of 1962. However, the developments on the India-China border in the western sector in April 2013 brought to the fore the sensitivities of the border dispute between India and China which remains unresolved till today.
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| 14 |
ID:
114503
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author argues that U.S. interest in Asia traditionally has been maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony. Yet against this anti-hegemony objective is balanced an attempt to accommodate China. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with America to address common challenges and mutual interests.
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| 15 |
ID:
133964
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The widespread debate on an East Asian power shift is generally based on the crude notion that power and capability are interchangeable. We critique this view and offer the alternative that power is the capacity of actors and discourses to produce effects- what we call relational and productive power, respectively. We also engage in a reflexive exercise by addressing the productive power of the power-shift debate itself, and emphasize the danger that this debate might enable the kind of realpolitik that it forebodes.
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| 16 |
ID:
126629
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou and his Kuomintang (KMT) government in Taiwan have adopted the policy of seeking greater economic cooperation with China in exchange of reducing confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. By endorsing the 'One China' principle, the KMT government successfully resumed dialogue with Beijing and signed 18 agreements, ranging from allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan to establishing a closer economic partnership. Yet President Ma's self-claimed achievements in cross-strait peace received severe criticisms from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which accused KMT's pro-China policy as selling out the democratic Taiwan to an authoritarian regime. This article examines the on-going debates between the ruling KMT and opposition DPP about proper strategies towards China, and how such debates make it unlikely for Taiwan to form an effective policy on cross-strait affairs. The differences between KMT and DPP on their respective China policies have led to prolonged distrust between both parties, and between DPP and Beijing. Facing an increasingly powerful China, both parties are short of better ideas to convince voters that their current policy will effectively secure Taiwan's sovereign status or will be beneficial to enhancing Taiwan's interests in the long term.
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| 17 |
ID:
132392
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The unconventional oil and gas revolution is certainly a game changer in the current international political setting, since it will bring the United States close to energy self-sufficiency. However, it seems unlikely that this new energy status will dramatically redefine US foreign policy and security priorities. In strategic regions such as the Middle East, US interests are expected to remain unchanged, while the new energy status will contribute only in part to modifying the US approach towards the EU's energy posture vis-à-vis Russia. What the new American energy condition is likely to change are the tools and policy options available to Washington to cope with the strategic challenges - China's power in primis - emerging in the multipolar international relations system.
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| 18 |
ID:
126584
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines, from an historical perspective, how the idea of the 'responsibility of power' speaks to Chinese political thought, and assesses its significance to China's evolving engagement with global governance today. It argues that a shift in China's global mentality is now underway: from an aversion to taking the lead to one which sees China reprising its role as a global power and shouldering the responsibilities attached to this status in the management of world affairs. But, contrary to conventional depictions of China's 'responsible power' identity as an externally imposed or purely modern construct, the article illustrates how notions of responsibility and the corollary concept of responsible governance are not new, but have deep roots in Chinese traditions of statecraft and corresponding visions of world order. Taking into account the complex interplay between Chinese conceptions of responsibility and expectations of its global role, change is necessarily situated amidst historical continuity, as linkages are drawn between China's past and its present.
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| 19 |
ID:
137445
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dramatic increase in China's economic and hence political power and influence is a common story around the world. Just how clearly and well does this story get across to citizens of some nations other than China, itself? In particular, we ask what Americans know about China. Do they observe its rise? Are their views simple or rich and nuanced? How do they vary across the public? What leads to more positive and what leads to more negative views of China? We report the results of a survey of the American population designed to address these questions. We find that they are reasonably knowledgeable of China's rise and that they have rich and nuanced perceptions of a variety of dimensions of China, its society, economy and polity. These views are, on balance, not especially positive, but the more cosmopolitan the citizen, the more likely they are to hold positive views. Those who are Democrats, who are liberals, and who have had the opportunity to travel in China are especially likely to have positive impressions.
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| 20 |
ID:
187649
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Will China displace the United States as the world's leading power by the centenary of Communist rule in 2049? The outcome will depend on many unknowns including what the two countries do over the next three decades. US leaders are likely to rely on their mental maps of how the world works. The primary sources of their mental maps tend to come from historical analogies and from international relations theories. Both are highly imperfect representations of reality. Historical metaphors and analogies are rife in the debate over how to understand the current rise of China, but three are particularly salient: a Thucydides trap; a new Cold War; and 1914 sleepwalkers. This article discusses the merits and demerits of relying on each of these analogies in turn, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of prior mental maps that guided US policy-makers during the post-Cold War era. Chinese elites expect to replace the US as the leading global power by 2049. How should the US respond? Two prevalent historical analogies are misleading: a Thucydides trap about power transition, and a new Cold War that ignores the three-dimensional nature of US–China interdependence. More promising is the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into the First World War. A successful strategy must lay out conditions for a cooperative rivalry starting with a careful net assessment of power resources and the formulation of feasible goals.
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