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| 1 |
ID:
115492
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| 2 |
ID:
099899
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
America won an asymmetric war in Iraq and lost an asymmetric peace. Translating material power advantage into favourable political outcomes has been a challenge for great powers down the ages-what makes this bridge even more difficult to cross today is the raised expectations on the part of liberal publics about the moral purpose of US-led interventions. In this sense, Iraq is part of the explanation for why influential liberals believe there is a 'crisis' in America's world leadership. 'America after Iraq' subjects this claim to analytical scrutiny-in particular it addresses whether Iraq was simply a chapter in a longer book detailing American power and purpose in the post-9/11 world? In answering this question the article is drawn to consider conceptual debates about a shift in the international system from anarchy to hierarchy with the US as the hegemonic power. While it rejects strong versions of the hierarchy thesis that imply the Washington is the new Rome, it is nevertheless drawn to an understanding of a hierarchical form of ordering where the US oscillates between a hegemonic role and an imperial outlaw. Seen through this lens, the Iraq War was an intervention that happened because it could, and not because it was just or necessary. Public opinion and the weakness of domestic institutions are also critical factors in explaining how it was possible for a previously status-quo oriented hegemonic power to act recklessly and put the rules and institutions of international society under strain.
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| 3 |
ID:
088813
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| 4 |
ID:
173759
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| Summary/Abstract |
Warmaking and war preparation have changed significantly in the 21st century. A number of scholars have documented and analyzed these changes. Drawing on work focused upon “new war” and “new militarism,” we argue that one facet of these practices has received little attention—the environmental consequences of “new militarism.” Specifically, we contend that “asymmetric war” through the mechanism of risk-transfer militarism results in increased carbon emissions. Our analyses utilize fixed effects models for 126 countries using international panel data from 2000 to 2010. We sketch the differences in these outcomes for both developed and developing nations, contextualize carbon emissions within both times of economic prosperity and decline, provide evidence of the differential effects on carbon emissions by a nation’s world-systems standing, and provide empirical evidence of the rise of risk-transfer militarism and its negative effects on the environment.
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| 5 |
ID:
082172
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shifting U.S. defense policy to focus on asymmetric threats would distort defense priorities for years to come and trap U.S. armed forces in endless conflicts that military power cannot win.
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| 6 |
ID:
134444
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Wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan should be understood as hybrid wars, wars in which elements of ethnic or tribal conflict, ideologically based insurgency, factional squabbling, and organized crime are inextricably intertwined, with the same actors playing multiple and partially conflicting roles. Hybrid war is inherently transnational, featuring transnational crime networks, “migrant warriors,” transnational diaspora links, legitimate international trade, and foreign intervention. It takes place in hybridized states reliant on local warlords and other actors whose power prevents effective state-building. In this context, while counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes appropriate military strategy and tactics, the core problem is more political than military. Since a hybridized client state is not likely to be politically reformable even if a foreign ally achieves military success, outside allies like the United States should generally refrain from boots-on-the-ground intervention, pursuing instead a diplomatic solution, even though such a deal is likely to be unpalatable.
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| 7 |
ID:
127745
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's past history is laced with aggression and blatant disregard to world opinion. The PLA is well ahead of the Indian Army and this ever-widening gap, if not checked and bridged, will catapult Chinese adventurism. We should expect no respite from increasing Chinese pressure. China-Pakistan are hand in glove in waging asymmetric war against India and the situation is likely to get increasingly volatile inadvertently egged on by US-China and US-Pakistan equations and heightened Chinese aggressive posture. India needs to be prepared for a Chinese thrust into Arunachal Pradesh. We should have the capacity to thwart that and go for North Tibet employing not just the Mountain Strike Corps but all elements of national power.
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| 8 |
ID:
139572
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Standard conceptions of the relationship between international law and war in International Relations (IR) mostly oscillate between the sceptical view that law is mostly irrelevant in times of conflict, and the optimistic view that law is a meaningful moral standard that effectively constrains violence. Modern asymmetric conflicts between liberal democratic states and non-state actors such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or Hamas challenge these conceptions, however, as they are at once increasingly legal and extremely violent. Drawing inspiration from IR and International Law (IL) scholarship from multiple theoretical paradigms, this article examines the legal asymmetries before, during, and after asymmetric conflict. Noting that law is at once a useful tool and a strong normative force, it argues that a good understanding of legal asymmetries can supplement existing theories of asymmetric war, continue the dissolution of false dichotomies and open up interesting avenues of research in IR, and help both scholars and policymakers understand how international law influences modern asymmetric conflict against non-state actors.
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| 9 |
ID:
153022
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| Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017.
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| Description |
x, 219p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780198788171
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059103 | 355.02/CRE 059103 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
087453
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of contractors employed by private security companies (PSCs) has exploded in recent years, outpacing efforts to assess the consequences of increased reliance on PSCs for international humanitarian law (IHL). This matters both for the states that hire these companies and for the employees of PSCs on or near battlefields. This article examines the legal status of PSCs under the existing IHL framework, focusing on activities where PSC employees carry weapons and how the presence of PSCs in asymmetric conflicts increases the challenge of determining what actions are appropriate within the laws of war. In most cases, PSC employees cannot be accorded combatant status under IHL. However, the actions of private contractors may put their protection as civilians under IHL at risk, and this is particularly true in asymmetric conflicts. I argue that changing the status of PSCs on the battlefield under IHL to take into account the tasks they are performing is not the answer. Rather, bearing IHL in mind, states need to rethink the tasks that PSCs conduct on their behalf, even if this means reducing reliance on PSCs or limiting state military activities. Notably, the USA should re-evaluate its reliance on PSCs to conduct tasks in situations where PSC employees are likely to be pulled into hostilities.
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| 11 |
ID:
123440
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2013.
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Why do rebel groups often fight like an army despite the fact that they keep losing most of the time? I examine seven possible answers and find that insurgent forces are likely to use conventional war strategy and be "suicidal" when they receive material aid from outsiders to build up armed forces and fight on terrain that supports large movements, without knowing that such a strategy does not always work, while strong states make interventions to impose their own method of fighting. This finding has important implications for the analysis of asymmetric war, counterinsurgency, and international security.
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| 12 |
ID:
119136
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| 13 |
ID:
097839
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| 14 |
ID:
112104
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2012.
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Drawing on extensive research about global cities and citizens, this essay examines whether the proliferation of conflicts in cities across the world can overwhelm the urban capabilities that have historically enabled cities to triage conflict via commerce and civic engagement. Critical in this examination is recovering some of the differences between being powerless and being invisible or impotent. Under certain conditions the powerless make history without getting empowered in the process. There are two types of acute challenges facing cities that pertain to this question. One is asymmetric war and the urbanizing of war that it entails. My research finds that cities are a type of weak regime that can obstruct but not destroy superior military force; this weak regime rests on the civic character of cities. The second type of challenge concerns anti-immigrant hatred and violence. In an exploration of the hard work of making open cities, particular histories show us that it is possible to reposition the immigrant and the citizen as, above all, similar urban subjects, rather than essentially different. Cities are one of the key sites where new norms and identities are made. This is a particularly fluid process in our global era, when cities emerge once again as strategic economic, political and cultural sites.
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| 15 |
ID:
077425
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why are states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-à-vis much weaker adversaries? The theory I develop focuses on how the nature of a strong state's war aims affects prewar uncertainty about the cost of victory. I argue that the relative magnitude of the effect of military strength and resolve on war outcomes varies with the nature of the object at stake and that strong states become more likely to underestimate the cost of victory as the impact of resolve increases relative to that of war-fighting capacity. I evaluate the empirical implications of this theory against the historical record provided by the universe of major power military interventions since World War II. The results challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors such as military strength, resolve, troop commitment levels, and war-fighting strategies on asymmetric war outcomes
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