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| 1 |
ID:
126638
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Ian Brown first visited Thailand in the 1970s, it was a deeply fragmented place. The Vietnam War was raging and US Army personnel dominated downtown Bangkok. In the country's universities, leftists of varying degrees of radicalization fought ideological battles against a conservative military and business elite. Extrajudicial violence was commonplace, and intrigue about the true extent of Communist subversion in the country reigned. It was the height of the Cold War, and there was a palpable sense that ideological forces should be used to determine both the country's future and a correct interpretation of the past.1 So it is notable that Ian's early work not only managed to remain aloof from the political cauldron in which it was written, but that it was so clearly opposed to the historical determinism that was such a prevalent feature of the time
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| 2 |
ID:
126656
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the revolution of 1932 that ended absolute monarchy in Siam, a new government came into power that sought to legitimize its rule by encouraging mass identification with the state. Practically, the expansion of a wage economy and the development of a state-led education system were seen by government officials as central to promoting a sense of citizenship to as yet disinterested rural communities. Throughout its first decade in power, the government thus set up projects to provide such groups with skills that might contribute to their overall material advancement. Following the lead of similar endeavours, particularly in India, one of the principal ways in which it would do this was through the production and bringing to market of cotton textiles. However, with foreign imports both superior in quality and cheaper than anything produced internally, the state struggled to establish a public relations message that might convince consumers to purchase Thai-produced textiles. As a result of specific limitations rooted in Thailand's ambiguous status globally, this meant that Thai leaders struggled to replicate the success of such movements elsewhere
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| 3 |
ID:
179075
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the early Cold War, U.S. aid poured into Thailand. This flow of money, people, and expertise had a profound impact on the country’s social, political, and economic development. Payments and support to the Thai military proved instrumental in securing the power of Thailand’s authoritarian military leaders, while the proliferation of U.S.-funded road and infrastructure programs helped expand the control of the Thai state from the capital into rural areas.1 More broadly, U.S. support laid the foundations for a development trajectory that, while furnishing the country with impressive economic growth, hugely benefitted Thailand’s capitalist and royalist elite.2 Despite the implications of such payments, this article argues that during the 1960s, U.S. aid was subtlety recast into gifts of tribute that increased the legitimacy of the young King Bhumibol in the eyes of the Thai public.
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| 4 |
ID:
077696
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