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| 1 |
ID:
032321
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| Publication |
London, WeidenFeld and Nicolson, 1973.
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| Description |
xiii, 346p.: ill., mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
0297765159
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 011497 | 923.5611/NIC 011497 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
095368
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| 3 |
ID:
106119
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| 4 |
ID:
189707
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2022, Finland and Sweden both announced that they had decided to apply for membership in NATO. This was a dramatic shift in both countries’ foreign and security policies, but a logical consequence of their European Union membership and close partnership with NATO in the post–Cold War era. For both Finland and Sweden, the key motivation for joining NATO was the need for greater strategic stability in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The swift decisions to cast aside their traditional military nonalignment cannot be understood without considering the strong emotional response in public opinion to Russia’s unprovoked war.
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| 5 |
ID:
138183
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| Summary/Abstract |
In late February and March 2014, shortly after the violent overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops to occupy the Crimean Peninsula, which had long been part of Ukraine. Putin’s subsequent annexation of Crimea sparked a bitter confrontation with Western governments and stoked deep anxiety in Central and Eastern Europe about the potential for Russian military encroachments elsewhere. Nowhere has this anxiety been more acute than in Poland and the three Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—where fears have steadily mounted as Russia has helped to fuel a civil war in eastern Ukraine while undertaking a series of military provocations in the Baltic region.
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| 6 |
ID:
008678
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| Publication |
1995.
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| Description |
24-31
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| 7 |
ID:
113318
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian-language skills have declined significantly throughout Central Asia among the titular and other local ethnic groups. Nevertheless, even in countries with minute Slavic minorities, Russian continues to be used for many different types of communication, and enjoys a high level of prestige, including in higher education and in top levels of professional, economic and political spheres. The use of Russian in elite domains and its association with high quality in Central Asia stands in contrast to the situation in the former Soviet republics of the Baltic and South Caucasus.
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| 8 |
ID:
180732
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE FUNDAMENTAL economic, political and medical challenges before us are universally recognized. Discussion is centered around a second question - namely: How are these challenges effecting global and European agendas? With respect to the East European security agenda, there has been practically no effect. In 2021, the United States and NATO will step up their military activity in Poland and what are known as the Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and try to create as much trouble as possible for Russia and Belarus. Russia will be the hypothetical adversary in the planned Defender-Europe 21 command post exercise, as in preceding Defender-Europe exercises. This was common knowledge for a long time, but everybody avoided discussing it publicly. That has changed. For example, the Jamestown Foundation1 is no longer wondering whether attacking Russia and Belarus is advisable but is deliberating about what tactics to use in such an attack - for instance, what would be the quickest way to the "Smolensk Gate" [20].
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| 9 |
ID:
070169
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| 10 |
ID:
156375
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