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| 1 |
ID:
158679
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on the India–Pakistan nuclear conundrum has neglected the impact of the international normative environment on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. This article fills that gap, by looking at the impact of the nuclear taboo on Indo-Pakistani strategic interactions during the 1999 Kargil war and the 2002 border standoff. The nuclear taboo, rather than nuclear deterrence, explains the non-use of nuclear weapons. During both crises the nuclear taboo entered the decision-making process instrumentally, in the form of perceived reputational “costs.” The Indian and Pakistani emerging nuclear doctrines endanger a fragile nuclear taboo that would be strengthened by a bilateral non-first use accord. Whether India and Pakistan can move from an instrumental to a substantive acceptance of the nuclear taboo will depend on whether the United States and the other nuclear weapon states, included in the Nonproliferation Treaty, play the role of norm entrepreneurs and strengthen the nuclear taboo at the global level.
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| 2 |
ID:
169184
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| 3 |
ID:
169183
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| 4 |
ID:
077735
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Unlike the previous adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, where communications and an understanding nuclear signaling developed over decades and were generally effective, communication of intent at a time of escalating tension during a crisis between the United States and a nuclear-armed regional aggressor is likely to be complicated by myriad asymmetries, for example culture, intelligence capabilities, and doctrine. This article considers the characteristics required of successful nuclear signaling in such a context, the options currently available to the United States, and possible alternatives for the future
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