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| 1 |
ID:
077883
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Claims by liberal states to be furthering democratic values and material prosperity are being contested due to the manner in which liberal states are attempting to provide for their own security, to the way in which democracy is being more forcefully projected onto the international order, and to the dislocations and inequality associated with global capitalism. The appeal of liberalism as a form of political and economic organization has declined even as its tenets have come to be taken for granted by virtue of their grounding in scientific reasoning. A sustainable resolution to the crisis of legitimacy of the liberal state requires the internal regeneration of the liberal state itself, a renewed commitment to dialogue in multilateral institutions, and a persuasive revitalization of the claims liberal states make that render their example attractive to others
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| 2 |
ID:
155696
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States is voluntarily abdicating much of its global leadership role. And it is doing so in what appears to be a fit of petulance, as though it has been aggrieved and made into a victim by the very international order it helped to build.”
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| 3 |
ID:
186566
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| Summary/Abstract |
Anti-corruption efforts are inherently political. Corruption charges can be levied against political opponents as an instrument of repression; they can also be used against troublesome allies in the same party coalition to further consolidate power. In this paper, we focus on Indonesia and ask: Do major corruption charges follow a presidential electoral cycle—and if so, how? We contend charges against prominent members of the government coalition are more likely to happen before an election, allowing the government to replace intra-party rivals with loyal allies. Conversely, charges against prominent opposition members are more likely to happen after an election when fears of retaliation are low, opportunities for credit-claiming are high, and there is an incentive to remove veto players who may inhibit implementing the government's agenda. To test this argument, we use an original, newly assembled dataset of all major corruption charges—i.e., those involving high-profile politicians and garnering international attention—in Indonesia from 1998–2015 as reported in the Associated Press. We find a significant and robust relationship between the electoral calendar and major corruption charges. This relationship is robust across presidential administrations. These results yield insights into how anti-corruption efforts can become a political tool and counsel caution about the effectiveness of “good governance,” especially in new democracies. Finally, we discuss how contextual political factors external to Indonesia's anti-corruption commission, reinforce this empirical pattern.
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