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| 1 |
ID:
078022
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abe Shinzô took over as prime minister of Japan on September 26, 2006. Thanks to the support of former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirô and his own popularity among the public at large, Abe assumed office with a strong base after winning the Liberal Democratic Party presidency with an impressive 66% of the total vote from LDP Diet members and local party chapters. In his previous positions as chief cabinet secretary and LDP secretary general, Abe supported the reforms initiated by the Koizumi administration.
According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun (published on September 28, 2006), the newly formed Abe cabinet enjoyed an approval rating of 63%-not quite as high as Koizumi's public support on taking office, but still the third-highest approval rating on record for a Japanese prime minister. However, a more recent Asahi poll (December 12, 2006) showed his public support dropping to 47%, owing mainly to disillusionment among young voters and those with no party affiliation (independent voters). The major reasons given were the vagueness of Abe's policy positions on issues and his decision to readmit into the LDP a group of dissenters who had opposed Koizumi's postal privatization plan.
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| 2 |
ID:
178469
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Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have new leaders for the first time since 1989: Shavkat Mirziyoyev as Uzbek president and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as Kazakh president. This article uses a theoretical framework based on the literatures of leadership change and political succession while overlaying this literature with the type of economic policies followed by each former leader to analyse the political and economic transitions in these countries. Mirziyoyev has legitimized his authority, even though he was not part of the elite, through reforms designed to help the people (as Karimov had envisioned in the ‘Uzbek way’). In contrast, Nazarbayev’s policies were centred around the state as a facilitator of economic development, a problem for citizens in an economic downturn. While Tokayev transitioned through a formal electoral process, his was a ‘managed’ designation, with the charismatic leader still in a formal position of power, leaving Tokayev without a separate base of legitimacy.
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| 3 |
ID:
146902
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South Korea has shifted from a relatively well-educated but poorly remunerated workforce to a highly skilled and compensated one in high-value-added industries. This paper analyzes the South Korean government’s science and technology policy and the supply of scientists and engineers in emerging industries. We note a potential shortfall of skilled talent in the near future.
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| 4 |
ID:
080950
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2008.
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Despite the belief of some that British Prime Minister Brown's attitudes towards the European Union could not be predicted, much in his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that Britain's role within the European Union would not be a high priority of his premiership. Early indications bear out this expectation. There will probably not be a British referendum on the Reform Treaty, but the rhetoric employed by Brown's government to describe the Treaty will be negative and minimalist. Although no significant body of British opinion favours withdrawal from the European Union, British popular resentment towards the Union is unlikely to disappear under Brown's leadership
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| 5 |
ID:
087667
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Samuel P. Huntington describes the diverse political processes through which thirty-five countries moved from authoritarianism toward democracy and derives guidelines from these experiences for future "democratizers."
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| 6 |
ID:
165456
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Leaders and leadership changes are found to influence states’ foreign policy decisions, in particular with respect to war and peace between states. Although this issue is also addressed in the qualitative literature on intrastate wars, the influence of leadership turnovers in civil war has received limited systematic attention. One reason for this is the scarcity of quantitative data on rebel group leaderships. To fill this gap, we present a comprehensive dataset on leadership changes in rebel groups, 1946–2010, organized by rebel-month. The effects of leadership changes among parties engaged in civil war are argued to be more complex than those found in interstate disputes. In this article we present our theoretical argument followed by presentation of the variables in the dataset and descriptive statistics. To demonstrate the potential research value of the dataset we examine the impact of leader shifts on civil war settlement in Africa. We conclude with avenues for future research which might benefit from this dataset.
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| 7 |
ID:
114854
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2012.
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What precipitated the 2003-06 "high tide" of petitioning Beijing and why did the tide wane? Interviews and archival sources suggest that a marked increase in petitioners coming to the capital was at least in part a response to encouraging signals that emerged when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao adopted a more populist leadership style. Because the presence of tens of thousands of petitioners helped expose policy failures of the previous leadership team, the Hu-Wen leadership appeared reasonably accommodating when petitioners arrived en masse in Beijing. Soon, however, the authorities shifted towards control and suppression, partly because frustrated petitioners employed disruptive tactics to draw attention from the Centre. In response to pressure from above, local authorities, especially county leaders, turned to coercion to contain assertive petitioners and used bribery to coax officials in the State Bureau of Letters and Visits to delete petition registrations. The high tide receded in late 2006 and was largely over by 2008. This article suggests that a high tide is more likely after a central leadership change, especially if a populist programme strikes a chord with the population and elite turnover augments confidence in the Centre and heightens expectations that it will be responsive to popular demands.
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| 8 |
ID:
146903
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This article contends that South Korea’s behaviors toward China since 1992 can be fully understood when the structural variables of the strategic environment—i.e., economic interdependence, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system, and the North Korean threat—are combined with the domestic variable of Seoul’s leadership change and its perception of threat.
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