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| 1 |
ID:
078033
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of China has intensified the international segmentation of production processes within Asia, but has not created an autonomous engine for the region's trade, as Asia still depends on outside markets for its final goods exports. The reorganisation of production has weakened the position of the advanced economies in Asia's trade, but up to now has not severely affected the position of the emerging Asian economies. However, the deterioration of China's terms of trade raises the question of the sustainability of its recent growth strategy
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| 2 |
ID:
161096
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| Summary/Abstract |
Under the wave of regionalism, India like other developing countries started
to integrate at regional level. At the initial stage, it wanted to establish strong
trade relations with its neighbouring countries. It (India) signed its first free
trade agreement (FTA) with Sri Lanka in 1998, which became operational from
2000. Thereafter, bilateral trade continued to increase with increasing rate. It
is in this context, the present study attempts to explore India’s trade potential
and prospects with Sri Lanka, utilised revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and
trade intensity Index (TII). The results of RCA show that India has strong and
sustainable trade specialisation (RCA > 1) in the export of edible vegetables
and certain roots and tubers, coffee, tea mate and spices, cotton etc to Sri Lanka.
This comparative advantage helps not only to diversify product baskets, but also
lead to increased volume of trade. India has no comparative advantage in the
import of any product from Sri Lanka. India has intensity of trade with Sri Lanka
since 1991. India has sustainable trade potential and prospects with Sri Lanka and
been a net exporter to it. Efforts should be made to utilise this potential.
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| 3 |
ID:
187357
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| Summary/Abstract |
Among European arms producers, MBDA represents the most advanced example of industrial integration and cross-border specialisation, thanks to a unique model of French–British centres of competence. However, it constitutes an exception inside the European defence technological and industrial base. It is therefore relevant to analyse why MBDA was able to achieve such consolidation process from fragmented competences of the European missile industry and to merge once competing companies despite the lack of a unique regulatory framework at the European level. This article presents the main features of MBDA today. It analyses the consolidation process in the European missile industry that created MBDA. It underlines how cooperative programmes provided a critical impulse in favour of industrial consolidation and the specialisation of MBDA sites across Europe. It explains how technological and industrial assets were reshuffled across European borders. It focuses on exports as a key dimension for MBDA’s model. Finally, it concludes by exploring the limits that result from the lack of a unified regulatory framework in Europe.
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| 4 |
ID:
113112
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As Canada's military mission in Afghanistan winds down and the country faces several years of fiscal austerity, all of Canada's major political parties are agreed that Canadian defence budgets must stay level or be cut. This comes at a time when the defence department is slated to replace the Canadian Forces' (CF) major equipment fleets. Canada's defence establishment thus faces some critical decisions. One option is to try to maintain its expeditionary capabilities across all three services: army, navy and air force. Absent substantial new infusions of funds, however, this approach is likely to lead to an overall and largely chaotic reduction of capabilities. Another option is to make some difficult choices as to which expeditionary capabilities to maintain as part of a strategic review of Canada's future military needs. Such an option would ensure that Canada has at least some military capacities which can reliably be devoted to the most demanding international operations, while maintaining those capabilities required for domestic duties and North American defence. Pursuing this option would accord with the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Concept and the call for "Smart Defense" within the Alliance. This article assesses the arguments for and against the option of specialising Canada's future defence capabilities and explores scenarios as to what a future CF may look like.
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