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| 1 |
ID:
078062
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| 2 |
ID:
078060
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Five-and-a-half years ago, 19 terrorists hijacked four airplanes and changed the course of history. Just as we underestimated al-Qaeda then, we risk repeating the same mistake now. Al-Qaeda today is frequently spoken of as if it is in retreat: a broken and beaten organiza-tion, its leadership living in caves, cut off somewhere in remotest Waziristan incapable of mounting further attacks on its own and instead having devolved operational authority either to its various affiliates and associates or to entirely organically-produced, homegrown, terrorist entities. Isolated and demoralized, al-Qaeda is thus imagined to have been reduced to a purely symbolic role, inspiring copycat terrorist groups, perhaps, but lacking any operational capability of its own - a toothless tiger.
"Al-Qaeda," President Bush declared last October, "is on the run." But al-Qaeda, in fact, is on the march. It has regrouped and reorganized from the setbacks meted out to it by the United States and our coalition partners and allies during the initial phases of the global war on terrorism (GWOT)and is marshalling its forces to continue the epic struggle begun more than ten years ago. More than ever, al-Qaeda's revival reminds us of our continued failure to heed the advice of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. "If you know the enemy and know yourself," he famously advised centuries ago, "you need not fear the results of a hundred battles." Yet, if there has been one consistent theme in both America's war on terrorism and our melancholy involvement in Iraq, it is our serial failure to fulfill Sun Tzu's timeless admonition. The Bush administration's new strategy to "surge" 21,000 American troops into Iraq is the latest fundamental misreading of our enemy's mindset and intentions.
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| 3 |
ID:
078064
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the fall of the USSR in 1991, there appeared a new player in the South Caucasus whose role in this region used to be of great importance. Iran, once forced to retreat as a consequence of the Russian army's march to the south, has after more than 160 years received an opportunity to conduct an autonomous policy in the region again and attempt - if the geopolitical constellation permits - to realize its ancient strategic aims. Whether Iran will be successful in its attempt to restore its former influence in the South Caucasus will depend on Azerbaijan and - to a greater extent than conventionally assumed - on oil production and transportation issues. It is therefore suggested that Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have been crucial in the formation of the Islamic Republic's foreign-policy agenda in the region and will remain so in the future.
Another variable to be taken into account is the wider international context in which Iran finds itself today, particularly in terms of its relationship with the great powers of Russia, China and the West. Iran's policy may from this perspective be seen as a piece in the mosaic of a Eurasian "grand strategy" of local powers to limit the U.S. presence in the wider region of Central Eurasia. This article is an attempt to analyse Tehran's complex policies vis-Ã -vis its northwestern neighbor, focusing on the context of interstate relations
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| 4 |
ID:
078063
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| 5 |
ID:
078061
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| 6 |
ID:
078059
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