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| 1 |
ID:
159776
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews EU’s mediation attempts in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. After presenting the main challenges and opportunities of EU mediation in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) neighborhood, EU interventions in Egypt are discussed in relation to the 25 January 2011 revolution, during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi, and after the 3 July 2013 coup d’état, focusing specifically on the choice of mediation styles and their timing. It is argued that three contextual conditions that are typical of the crises that erupt during failed democratic transitions – their fast pace, their eminently domestic nature and significant power asymmetries between the main parties involved – exacerbate the structural problems that the EU faces when intervening in countries that are not current or potential candidates for accession. The analysis of EU mediation styles during Egypt’s transition provides a critical perspective on EU’s foreign policy making after the Treaty of Lisbon.
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| 2 |
ID:
093675
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, two global superpowers: the United States and Europe. Only these two actors are consistently able to project a full spectrum of 'smart power' internationally.
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| 3 |
ID:
078162
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| 4 |
ID:
140528
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| Summary/Abstract |
In April 2009, just three months after he took office, U.S. President Barack Obama traveled to Trinidad and Tobago for the Summit of the Americas. There, he told Latin America’s leaders that he wanted to begin “a new chapter of engagement” and an “equal partnership . . . based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values.” Most dramatically, he pledged to seek “a new beginning with Cuba,” which had not enjoyed diplomatic relations with the United States for five decades.
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| 5 |
ID:
139050
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the election of Maithripala Sirisena as President of Sri Lanka, and the formation of the National Unity Government, it is expected that India’s southern neighbour will have a more democratic polity as compared to the earlier one. In addition, there is also a general popular expectation that, under the new government, there would be a greater balance in dealing with developmental issues in various constituent provinces of the island nation. There is also a general hope that there will be a thawing in the almost frozen India-Sri Lanka relationship. The Sirisena government is also likely to have a positive approach towards India, already indicated by the few initiatives that his government has taken. It will try to mend relations with India not necessarily by jettisoning its relations with China. A deft political calculation will be required by the Sirisena government on the issue of the implementation of the 13th Amendment, as it has the potential to cause a significant political loss by an upset Sinhala majority. The best way forward for Sri Lanka would be in following a middle path in its foreign policy, keeping in mind strategic concerns of an important neighbour like India.
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