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| 1 |
ID:
078198
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| 2 |
ID:
185900
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines Malaysia’s evolving relations with China during the second Mahathir administration from 2018 to 2020 in political, economic, and security aspects. While much of the foreign media portrayed the unprecedented change of government in May 2018 as an instance of “pushing back” against China, this paper refutes this simplistic view. It argues that while there were uncertainties in bilateral relations in the initial period following the election, the “Mahathir 2.0” administration ultimately renewed and reaffirmed its relationship with China on a positive note. Economically, the Mahathir 2.0 administration sought to renegotiate Malaysia’s economic relationship with China to align it with its political economy agenda. In terms of security, Prime Minister Mahathir had at first sought to form a new normative framework but later came to adopt a more assertive stand in the South China Sea dispute. At the same time, he showed a continued (but cautious) willingness to engage in defense diplomacy and military-to-military relations with China. This paper analyzes these developments in light of the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism which takes into account the systemic, domestic, and personal factors in influencing the country’s foreign policy. It also interprets these developments as exercises in hedging by a small power in an age of increasing uncertainty.
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| 3 |
ID:
188225
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates and examines the efficacy of the multilateral and bilateral modalities or mechanisms in managing the South China Sea dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states. There are three multilateral modalities in the management and control of the South China Sea dispute: the “ASEAN + China,” “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” modalities. At the bilateral level, mechanisms have developed between China and the Philippines, China and Vietnam, and China and Malaysia. It is argued in this article that the “ASEAN + China” modality remains the most realistic multilateral arrangement currently, while the alternative options of “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” might be feasible in the long term. Meanwhile, while bilateral mechanisms have fostered trust building and pragmatic maritime cooperation in the South China Sea, they are facing a number of challenges.
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