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| 1 |
ID:
112784
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's approach to sovereignty reflects a close linkage between the recentralizing project domestically, and reassertion of Russia's position as a great power on the international scene. This article assesses the relative utility of constructivist and realist approaches in Russian readings of sovereignty. A constructivist approach is found to be more useful in treating sovereignty - it directs our attention toward the problem of developing a new post-Soviet identity, the role of culture and historical interpretation in foreign policy, Russian concepts of the hostile Other and domestic ideas linked to Russian concepts of federalism - all critical factors in understanding Russian foreign policy behavior. The major ideological construct of the post-communist period - sovereign democracy - insists that both sovereignty and democracy are socially and culturally determined, and therefore clash with Western interpretations of these concepts. The emergence of a new, post-modern and Western-dominated set of global norms limiting sovereignty is closely linked to continued tensions between Russia and the West.
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| 2 |
ID:
085538
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The coloured revolutions, including the Tulip Revolution, have exerted influences on Russian self-representations. At the same time, Russian self-identifications provided the framework within which meaning was attributed to the colour revolutions - they shaped the way in which the 'wave', and the Tulip Revolution within it, was framed. In general, the Tulip Revolution did not have the same resonance in Russian public discourse as the Rose, and in particular, Orange Revolutions, mostly because Ukraine had a place in Russian self-representations that Kyrgyzstan did not. Nevertheless, it crucially enabled a reading of the 'wave' as a wave of disorder and extremism, something that again resonated with Russian self-representations, as it re-confirmed a discourse of 'Russia in danger' that has persisted in Russian self-representations since 1991.
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| 3 |
ID:
078200
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sovereign democracy" carries two simultaneous messages to Russian society. The first message says that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the 'guided democracy' of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia's sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats
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