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| 1 |
ID:
078268
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although it is known that serious imperial rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean only began in the Fascist period, this article argues that Italian expansionism had already begun to pose a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean in 1912 following Italy's colonization of Libya. While the Italian state was still militarily and financially weak at this time, an Italian private financial institution, the Banco di Roma, engaged in a number of ventures in Egypt that led to complications in state-to-state relations. The article shows that the seeds of Anglo-Italian antagonism were sown in the hostile climate of the Egyptian-Libyan border through a series of incidents in the period between 1912 and 1914
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| 2 |
ID:
078269
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2007.
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The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations between 1963 and 1967 saw the debut on the international commercial stage of the EEC negotiating as a single entity. The Round thus represents a valuable opportunity to assess the impact of the EEC on the international trading system, the compatibility of regional integration with global trade liberalization, and the effectiveness of the Community system in allowing "Europe" to speak internationally with one voice. Its judgement is largely positive, noting in particular the strong connection between the EEC's emergence and both the original American decision to launch the Round and the main negotiating method employed - that of across-the-board tariff cuts. The Kennedy Round, in other words, constituted both a direct response to the Community's growing economic stature and an imitation at global level of the approach to tariff reduction that it had pioneered. The episode also provides a chance to examine the interplay between the EEC's two largest states, France and West Germany, and to suggest that the contrast between their respective approaches to the Kennedy Round was less profound than is normally suggested
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| 3 |
ID:
078272
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines Taiwan's relationship with Europe (both Western and East Central), paying particular attention to the Taiwanese diplomatic strategies and their consequences in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as to the European responses. It argues that although Taipei's greatest triumphs in Europe - such as the arms deals, diplomatic or consular agreements or gaining support for membership in international organizations - proved either sporadic or short-lived, their very existence demonstrated that the China factor did not necessarily restrict the European nations' choices with regards to the Taiwan issue. This was particularly so when Taipei's economic rewards seemed sufficiently compensating for China's economic or political sanctions. More importantly, however, Taiwan - through economic diplomacy - successfully established strong foundations for long-term dialogue with all of Europe through representative offices, bilateral committees, parliamentary exchanges and periodical visits by government officials. Thus, Europe's functional relationship with Taiwan, which focused mainly on economic and cultural issues, not only facilitated low-key political dialogue with the island, but also stimulated Europe's interest in the geopolitical stability in the Taiwan Strait.
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| 4 |
ID:
078270
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2007.
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Ireland had significant pull in domestic American politics, but was a minor power in world affairs. The Irish influence was inverse to the relationship the United States had with the United Kingdom. In 1964, these political and diplomatic factors converged when Eamon de Valera, the American born President of the Republic of Ireland, made one last tour of the United States. Lyndon Johnson used the trip to his political advantage without harming the relationship the United States enjoyed with the United Kingdom. Johnson showed a skillful touch in both the diplomacy and politics that went along with this visit, challenging dominant views about his competence in this area.
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| 5 |
ID:
078271
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity - particularly during the early stages of the Cold War - limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Moscow
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| 6 |
ID:
078267
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case - like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait - shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.
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| 7 |
ID:
078273
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| Publication |
2007.
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Past South African governments already felt the need for honours as instruments of diplomacy in the 1930s, but only instituted the Order of Good Hope in 1973. Inherited British attitudes to honours, the cessation in 1925 of the award of honours bearing titles, and long periods in which civilian honours were not awarded contributed to its frugal use. Wishing to recognize foreign assistance to the liberation movements, from 1994 President Mandela frequently put the Order to use, freely awarding leaders of foreign governments. However, restraint returned after the initial surge. Since instituting new orders in 2003, President Mbeki has emphasised substantial merit as the key to admission
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