Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:525Hits:20481486Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
HEGER, LINDSAY (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   116341


Organizing for resistance: how group structure impacts the character of violence / Heger, Lindsay; Jung, Danielle; Wong, Wendy H   Journal Article
Heger, Lindsay Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract How does the way in which a group organizes change the lethality of the group's attacks? In this article, we argue that groups organized vertically as hierarchies are likely to conduct more lethal attacks. We build our argument around three advantages inherent to centralized structures: functional differentiation, clear command and control structures, and accountability. We argue that each of these characteristics positively impacts an organization's ability to deliver an effective lethal blow. To test our argument, we use a mixed method approach, drawing on empirical evidence and support from a time-series case study. Our large-N analysis examines the trends in more than 19,000 attacks. In this test we develop a novel proxy measure for hierarchy based on a group's bases of operation and non-violent activities. To complement the empirical work, we examine the history of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. Over several decades of violent operations, this group's structure has changed dramatically. We analyze how these shifts impacted ETA's ability to maximize the effectiveness and damage of their attacks. In both the case study and large-N analysis, the more hierarchically organized the group, the more easily the group can orchestrate lethal attacks.
        Export Export
2
ID:   078287


Ruthless rulers: coalition size and the severity of civil conflict / Heger, Lindsay   Journal Article
Heger, Lindsay Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2007.
Summary/Abstract What explains the level of violence during civil wars? In this paper, we argue that the size of the ruling coalition is a critical determinant of the severity of conflict. To maintain control over patronage, elites will fight to ward off challengers. The degree to which they use coercion hinges upon the level of private benefits they receive, which is in turn determined by coalition size. Further, we expect democracies to be more constrained in their use of force due to larger government coalitions and constraints on power. To proxy for coalition size, we use new data on the ethnic affiliation of heads of state. An empirical analysis of over 200 armed civil conflicts reveals that conflicts involving smaller ruling coalitions yield a greater number of deaths
Key Words Conflict  Ethnic Conflict  Civil Conflict 
        Export Export