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| 1 |
ID:
110089
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE WAVE OF POPULAR RIOTS which swept the Middle East and North Africa and which remains the key factor behind the regional developments engulfed not only the poor countries but also those which coped both socially and economically.
Between 2004 and 2009, for example, Tunisia increased per capita income from 3.5 thousand Tunisian dinars ($2.7 thousand) to 5 thousand TND ($3.9 thousand); its middle class (60% of population) accounted for 83% of total consumption; 80% were house owners; 21% had cars. In oil-rich Libya the year 2011 began very much as usual: foodstuffs and money were distributed among the poor; some families received free car coupons practically on the eve of the uprising.1
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| 2 |
ID:
115865
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| 3 |
ID:
171000
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is often dismissed as a valid legal instrument within the larger framework of the North Korean legal system. This is an unsurprising outcome given the portrayal of North Korea as a totalitarian dictatorship, documented human rights abuses, and the lack of access to the country's lawmaking processes. It is also a foreseeable result if comparisons are made to liberal democratic constitutions where rights guarantees and judicial review are defining elements. However, the North Korean Constitution deserves more nuanced scrutiny in light of evolving research on socialist and authoritarian constitutionalism in Asia. This article argues that the DPRK Constitution should be included more substantively within the analytical frameworks of Asian, socialist, and authoritarian constitutionalism by virtue of how it functions to nation-build, legitimate institutional leadership, signal ideological shifts, regulate society on collectivist, duty-based principles, and guide economic reforms for development and modernization.
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| 4 |
ID:
155700
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| Summary/Abstract |
“By learning from aspects of imperfect meritocratic systems, including Chinese-style political meritocracy, democratic systems can improve their performance and buttress their legitimacy.”
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| 5 |
ID:
084441
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seeks to undermine democratisation in Central Asia. Prior studies of the interplay between international organisations and democracy have tended to examine only one half of this relationship: whether, how, and under what circumstances do international organisations promote democracy? However, the opposite has been largely ignored: how do international organisations sustain autocracy? Authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies aimed at preserving their political power and the SCO represents an additional strategy in this regard: utilising multilateral cooperation to defend themselves against regional or global democratic trends. As such, the 'Shanghai Spirit' may be a sign of things to come as autocratic leaders become more bold in their rejection of democratic norms.
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| 6 |
ID:
112496
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In both post-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia there are continuing struggles over the forms and extent of political representation. Importantly, many of the same ideologies are present across these different categories of regime. Ideas of, and constituencies for, non-democratic representation exist in democratic societies and vice versa. Alongside democratic notions of representation, populist, localist and consensus rationales compete for support. However, in contests to shape political representation, historical factors, including legacies of the Cold War and structural impacts of global capitalist development, are not favourable to the pursuit of interests through the independent, collective action-especially cohesive social movements involving trade unions-that characterised the experiences of democratisation in Western Europe. This profoundly influences the complexion of and levels of support for different ideologies of representation in the region.
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| 7 |
ID:
117718
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Taiwan's transition from authoritarian to democratic rule has not necessarily resulted in lower levels of perceived corruption on the island. Indeed, many Taiwan citizens have come to view the problem of corruption as worsening in recent years. To understand what these perceptions are and why they have emerged, this study examines Taiwanese attitudes toward corruption and its control from a bottom-up approach. By utilizing data from an original, nationwide public opinion survey, the authors identify the most prevalent corrupt behaviors and the institutions in Taiwanese society that are most susceptible to corruption. The paper then investigates three 'bottom-up' factors that help explain variations in the perception of corruption by citizens: encounter with government bureaucracy, party identification, and the effect of media. Analysis of survey data indicates that all three factors influence how Taiwanese people feel about corruption and corruption-related issues.
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| 8 |
ID:
110538
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real-as opposed to simulated-crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.
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| 9 |
ID:
112497
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the socio-political impact of the internet and new social media in East Asia. In particular it explores whether the new tools and platforms associated with the latter are having a democratising effect on the region's authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes by opening up a permissive online public sphere in which traditional hierarchies of power are challenged.
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| 10 |
ID:
170917
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| 11 |
ID:
107215
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| 12 |
ID:
165264
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains temporal variation in repression as a function of the “dissident calendar,” the set of events that serve as natural focal points for coordination. The core argument is that regimes can anticipate the events that create these focal points and engage in preemptive repression to survive their passing. This dynamic produces predictable, often cyclical patterns in repression. An analysis of dissident detentions in China from 1998 to 2014 shows that “focal events” alone appear to be responsible for more than 20 percent of dissident detentions over the analysis period. Such detentions tend to be shorter and rely less on formal criminal procedures, suggesting a “catch-and-release” dynamic. Additional analysis of detentions in Tibet shows how the calendar may vary by issue or group.
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| 13 |
ID:
111749
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An extensive literature has emerged recently that investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing regions of the world, including Latin America. Much of this work has focused on whether authoritarian or democratic rule is better for attracting FDI. Curiously, little attention has been devoted to unpacking regime type to see whether specific political institutional variables related to judicial strength and adherence to the rule of law are important FDI determinants. Based on panel data analysis and our own survey of US corporations, we find that judicial strength and rule of law elements are important determinants of FDI in Latin America.
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| 14 |
ID:
108024
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| 15 |
ID:
144491
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| Summary/Abstract |
Discourses on the Arab revolutions have, to date, focused on regime change and its implications for future democratization in the region. This essay explores the impetus behind the religiopolitical tensions in Tunisia and posits that to grasp the events unfolding since 2010 the unrest must be located within an understanding of the dynamic between the Islamists and the state under President Habib Bourguiba and, later, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The essay revisits the terms revolutionary and revolution within the Tunisian context and reflects on the application of the label revolutionary, contending that the act of selective labeling bears implications for an objective understanding of the revolution and its actors. Finally, the essay evaluates how far the political tensions of the past continue to mark the present through the subsequent generation of religious movements emerging from the revolution.
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| 16 |
ID:
120411
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In his opening address at the 2011 India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) summit held in Pretoria/Tshwane, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa said the essence of the grouping was 'Back to Basics: When Democracy and Development Work Together for a Better Life'. He argued that the 'basic building block of the kind of societies the IBSA countries continue to strive for' are those where 'democracy and development work together' because such societies 'prosper and create a better life for their people'.
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| 17 |
ID:
111934
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armen Oganesyan, Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs, advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. As in Africa, in the 1960s, colonial empires started crumbling one after another, so today authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, which only recently had seemed quite stable, began to collapse. I would like to recall that the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa and came to be known as the "Arab spring" began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010 following Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest against police corruption and brutality.
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| 18 |
ID:
115607
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| 19 |
ID:
121616
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The phenomenal success achieved by Islamic political parties in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011 is one of the most significant and frequently noted developments to follow from those momentous events. Within a few months of the demise of long-standing authoritarian regimes, Islamist groups that had been banned and oppressed for decades found themselves flourishing. Soon El-Nahda in Tunisia and then Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood tasted victory in constituent assembly, legislative, and eventually presidential elections. A new area of political Islam in power had seemingly arrived.
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| 20 |
ID:
111748
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A key contention of the transitional justice movement is that the more comprehensive and vigorous the effort to bring justice to a departed authoritarian regime for its political crimes, the better the democratization results. This essay challenges this common assumption with empirical evidence from the Iberian Peninsula, where the global wave of democratization of the late twentieth century was born. In Portugal, political trials and bureaucratic purges intended to cleanse the state and society of the authoritarian past nearly derailed the transition to democracy by descending into a veritable political witch-hunt. In Spain, by contrast, forgetting and moving on prevailed, an approach that facilitated the country's emergence as the paradigmatic example of a successful democratic transition. Among the many lessons suggested by these counter-intuitive examples is that there is no pre-ordained outcome to any attempt at transitional justice. This is so because the principal factors driving the impulse toward justice against an old regime tend to be political in nature rather than ethical or legal. In Portugal, the rise of transitional justice mirrored the radicalism of the left-wing revolution that launched the transition to democracy. In Spain, the absence of transitional justice reflected the pragmatism imposed by the self-reinvention of the authoritarian regime and the political trauma inflected by the Spanish Civil War.
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