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| 1 |
ID:
078664
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese interpretations of the Lisbon Strategy fall mainly into two different aspects: one focuses on the more or less neo-liberal orientation of the Lisbon Strategy, the other tries to assess the implications of this orientation toward the norms of national social welfare states. This article focuses on one of the main tool deployed by the Lisbon Strategy, i.e., the "innovation", discussed its definitions, contents, practices and constraints. The article concludes that the direction of the Lisbon Strategy is more important than the quantitative goals it has set up to achieve, and China can in many ways learn from European experiences reviewed in designing and implementing the Lisbon Strategy
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| 2 |
ID:
143435
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using hand-collected data on IPOs by private-owned enterprises, this article examines the regulatory benefits of political connections in China's state-controlled going public process, a subject that has rarely been investigated in existing literature. This article makes the following findings: first, political connections have significant positive impact on enterprises' chances of being approved for IPOs; second, enterprises with political connections are significantly more likely to receive preferential treatments (e.g., higher offering price-to-earning ratio) from regulatory authorities; third, enterprises with political connections are significantly less likely to be selected for pre-IPO on-site auditing by regulatory authorities. The findings of this article may provide answer to the question why China has been so reluctant to adopt disclosure-based regulatory regime as well as insights into the puzzle of the consistent poor performance of China's stock markets.
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| 3 |
ID:
144571
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paradox that the performance of China’s stock market has not matched the performance of China’s real economy has been puzzling. This article argues that one of the major causes of the poor performance of China’s stock markets is that ever since their establishment, China’s stock markets have been systematically politicized by the ruling party to promote its political agenda. The mantra of ‘socialism’ of the ruling party has turned the stock markets into a mere fund-raising vehicle largely for failing state-owned enterprises, with investors’ interests being only a secondary consideration. The regulation of stock markets is subject to the principle of maintaining one-party ruling. Such a systematic politicization of stock markets has caused some serious consequences for China’s stock markets and economic growth.
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