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PLÜMPER, THOMAS (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   078686


Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution / Plümper, Thomas; Schneider, Christina J   Journal Article
Plümper, Thomas Journal Article
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Publication 2007.
Summary/Abstract Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds until 2004, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.
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2
ID:   131490


Peer-effect in counterterrorist policies / Neumayer, Eric; Plümper, Thomas; Epifanio, Mariaelisa   Journal Article
Neumayer, Eric Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract Existing accounts posit that defensively oriented counterterrorist policies create negative externalities and result in regulatory competition that induces governments to increasingly tighten their policies. We argue that rather than causing an unconditional global "race to the top," spatial dependence in counterterrorist policies is limited to within groups of countries exposed to a similar level of threat from international terrorism. Countries strongly differ in their propensity to become the target of an international terror attack. Governments can safely ignore counterterrorist policies enacted by countries outside their "peer group," but they must pay attention to measures undertaken by their peers. We test several predictions derived from our theory in an empirical analysis of counterterrorist regulations in twenty Western developed-country democracies over the period 2001 to 2008.
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