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TRADE MEASUREMENT (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   127777


Politics of compliance with adverse WTO dispute settlement ruli / Zhang, Xiaowen; Li, Xiaoling   Journal Article
Zhang, Xiaowen Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract Starting from 2004, China's trading partners, in particular the United States, have increasingly utilized the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system (DSS) to challenge China's trade-related measures. As a major player in world trade, how China responds to adverse rulings is not only important to its trading partners, but also for the future of the international trade regime. China has thus far held a relatively good compliance record when facing adverse panel and/or Appellate Body rulings, except for the recent delay in full compliance in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products. Through examining the factors affecting China's decision making when targeted in a WTO dispute, this article finds that, in general, China is highly motivated to comply with the WTO DSS due to the reputational costs of noncompliance. Nevertheless, the recent delay in compliance in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products also demonstrates that successful implementation could be impeded by certain politically influential interest groups, especially when the measure at dispute is politically sensitive.
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2
ID:   078689


Power: the missing link in the trade conflict relationship / Xiang, Jun; Xu, Xiaohong; Keteku, George   Journal Article
Xiang, Jun Journal Article
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Publication 2007.
Summary/Abstract We join the debate on trade interdependence and conflict with a reexamination of Barbieri's (1996) intriguing empirical results showing that under certain circumstances, trade interdependence causes conflict. We argue that these findings resulted from a specification that was missing a variable. We return to Barbieri's models and introduce two independent power measures for countries within each dyad. When a correctly specified trade-conflict regression model incorporating the new power variables is performed, the constraining effect of interdependence becomes evident, and the results obtained are the reverse of Barbieri's.
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