|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
113385
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
145587
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Appearances in cyberspace are deceptive and problematic. Deception in the cyber domain poses an immensely difficult challenge for states to differentiate between espionage activities in cyberspace and cyber attacks. The inability to distinguish between cyber activities places US cyber infrastructure in a perilous position and increases the possibility of a disproportionate or inadequate response to cyber incidents. This paper uses case analysis to examine the characteristics associated with the tools and decisions related to cyber espionage and cyber attacks to develop a framework for distinction leveraging epidemiological models for combating disease.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
173365
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For well over twenty years, we have witnessed an intriguing debate about the nature of cyberspace. Used for everything from communication to commerce, it has transformed the way individuals and societies live. But how has it impacted the sovereignty of states? An initial wave of scholars argued that it had dramatically diminished centralised control by states, helped by a tidal wave of globalisation and freedom. These libertarian claims were considerable. More recently, a new wave of writing has argued that states have begun to recover control in cyberspace, focusing on either the police work of authoritarian regimes or the revelations of Edward Snowden. Both claims were wide of the mark. By contrast, this article argues that we have often misunderstood the materiality of cyberspace and its consequences for control. It not only challenges the libertarian narrative of freedom, it suggests that the anarchic imaginary of the Internet as a ‘Wild West’ was deliberately promoted by states in order to distract from the reality. The Internet, like previous forms of electronic connectivity, consists mostly of a physical infrastructure located in specific geographies and jurisdictions. Rather than circumscribing sovereignty, it has offered centralised authority new ways of conducting statecraft. Indeed, the Internet, high-speed computing, and voice recognition were all the result of security research by a single information hegemon and therefore it has always been in control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
119953
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article is an attempt to interrogate some of the predominant forms of analogical reasoning within current cyber-security discourse, with a view to clarifying their unstated premises, major strengths and, vitally, points of conceptual failure. It seeks to improve dialogue between and across the various epistemic communities involved with cyber-security policy. As we seek to adapt to the new security realities of the information age, it is incumbent upon scholars and strategists to address the benefits of connectivity, in all its dimensions, as much as the threats it presents. Current cyber-security discourse channels us into a winner-takes-all modality that is neither desirable nor necessary in the current strategic reality.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
126187
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012-13.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Outline cybersecurity measures to combat the internet's dark side
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
190074
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
186764
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
137234
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper aims to analyze confidence-building measures (CBMs) for cyberspace taking place in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, it explores features of cyber security in the Northeast Asian region and concepts of CBMs for cyberspace. Then, it studies networks of CBMs for cyberspace that took place on the government level in the region from 2009 through the first half of 2014 by using the network analysis method, which is useful for studying current social relations. This study analyzes the structure of CBMs networks used in the region for the past six years and the actors. Conclusions of this study are as follows: First, CBMs for cyberspace in Northeast Asia are focused on the United States. Second, the CBMs in the region have similar features to those of traditional security cooperation. Thirdly, they are strongly based on realism. From the perspective of networks, this study is meaningful in that it used a macro approach to analyze CBMs, which was difficult to perform by using conventional methods.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
152428
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There are numerous challenges to the national security of India and the extent and scope of threats are complex, varied and vast. C Arunkumar and P Sakthivel argue that if appropriate actions are not taken, the threats may result in the gradual degradation of the Indian state. They suggest a new set of policies and mechanisms in diverse arenas.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
159971
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Cyberspace appears to offer limitless possibilities for collaboration and economic opportunity in the twenty-first century, but cyber-attacks, breaches of privacy, and security threats also have become commonplace. In the face of these challenges, a number of governments have been locked in debates over the future of cyberspace governance, including the Russian Republic, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States. This study examines the ongoing contestation of the international normative architecture for cyberspace, with a focus on the United States’ role as a norm ‘antipreneur’, seeking to defend the status quo multi-stakeholder norm for a more open Internet from entrepreneurial efforts by Russia and China to establish multilateral governance with ‘cyber-sovereignty’. Drawing on recent advances in constructivist theory, the study explores antipreneurial strategies to contest efforts by entrepreneurs to introduce new norms, as well as implications for norm development and change. Process tracing is employed to examine cyberspace governance debates. The study concludes by discussing prospects for an International Code of Conduct for Cyberspace, as well as theoretical and political implications of antipreneurship in modern norm contestations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
179228
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The situation in cyberspace is now taking a very tense turn, due to the rivalry between the world largest economies for leadership in the digital environment. This paper analyzes the role and importance of China's strategy in the information environment and demonstrates the growing impact China has on the decision-making process in the digital environment in the international arena with regard to different technical issues and managing principles. We examine China's defense policy in this area, as well as the country's gradual transformation into one of the world's cyber superpowers capable of challenging American dominance on the Internet, which has already led to sharp confrontation and rivalry between China and the United States in today's information environment; to technological wars; to the development of arsenals of military viruses on both sides; and to the development of information war strategies and tactics.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
181170
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
It is often predicted that rising powers such as China will seek to reshape the international order as they gain influence. Drawing on comparative analysis of the maritime and cyber domains, this article argues that China poses a challenge to the global commons because its actions reflect a pragmatic focus on national interest that that disrupts more collaborative conceptions of their governance. However, instead of directly rejecting existing regimes, China has pursued a mixed strategy of complying when these regimes confer benefits and employing contestation or subversion when they conflict with its strategic aims. In particular, China has used contestation and subversion to push for the enclosure of the maritime and cyber domains, extending ideas of sovereignty and territoriality to them to varying extents. While the relatively well-institutionalized nature of maritime governance has limited China’s focus to the application of specific rules in areas where it prioritizes sovereign control, the embryonic status of the cyber regime has enabled China to call into question the fundamental definition of cyberspace as a global common. Subversion has also allowed China to accomplish strategic goals through ‘gray zone’ tactics, resulting in increased conflict below the level of war in both domains.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
157286
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
1. On 1 March 2017, the Chinese government released a document entitled “International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace” (ISCC).1 The ISCC comprehensively analyzes opportunities and challenges in cyberspace, advocates “peace, sovereignty, shared governance, and shared benefits” as the basic principles of international exchange and cooperation in cyberspace, establishes six strategic goals, namely, safeguarding sovereignty and security, developing a system of international rules, promoting fair internet governance, protecting legitimate rights and interests of citizens, promoting cooperation on digital economy, and building platforms for cyber culture exchange. Accordingly, nine specific plans of action to promote international cooperation in cyberspace were formulated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
090618
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
110920
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In March 2011, the U.S. computer security company RSA announced that hackers had gained access to security tokens it produces that let millions of government and private-sector employees, including those of defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, connect remotely to their office computers. Just five months later, the antivirus software company McAfee issued a report claiming that a group of hackers had broken into the networks of 71 governments, companies, and international organizations. These attacks and the many others like them have robbed companies and governments of priceless intellectual property and crucial military secrets. And although officials have until recently been reluctant to name the culprit, most experts agree that the majority of the attacks originated in China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
122351
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
It is very hard - in most cases impossible - to track down the source of a cyber attack. Since the U.S. and Russia have reserved the right to respond to cyber incidents like they were conventional acts of aggression, the two countries must work out confidence-building measures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
133611
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The pressing issues around cyberspace revolve around internet governance, cybersecurity and drawing up rules of the road for the new domain of cyberwar. While each of these is at a different stage in its evolution cycle, cyberspace itself is facing a watershed moment as insecurities mount. The fragmentation of cyberspace seems inevitable unless there is accelerated movement on resolving the fundamental issues of internet governance and cybersecurity that have been hanging fire for well over a decade.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
181385
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the role of the Unified Telecommunications Network in the Russian Federation within the system of state power and military control in conditions of globalized national information-telecommunications resources. It presents a conceptual model (Concept) of a Unified Electronic Communications Network fragment that establishes interrelations between its basic elements and defines the role and place of the Concept.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
150095
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains why powerful states develop capabilities for warfare in cyberspace. It argues that despite the apparent limited strategic utility of cyberspace, powerful states develop cyber capabilities to compete for military dominance in the international system. This argument is best explored using a neorealist framework because it provides the most compelling explanation for the competitive behavior of states in cyberspace. Three key implications can be derived from the study: the proliferation of capabilities for warfare in cyberspace is inevitable; powerful states will still dominate cyberspace; and cyberattacks may escalate to kinetic attacks due to the uncertainties regarding existing cyber capabilities.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
138340
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For more than a decade, Russia's foreign policy has sought to challenge the international consensus on a number of issues. Today, as the international internet ecosystem is becoming more volatile, Moscow is eager to shift the western narrative over the current global internet governance regime, in which the United States retains considerable leverage. In a context wherein states increasingly forge links between cyberspace and foreign policy, this article explores Russia's deepening involvement in internet governance. The disclosure by Edward Snowden of the US government's wide net of online surveillance contributed to legitimize the Russian approach to controlling online activity. While the struggle around the narrative of internet governance has been heating up since then, Russia actively seeks to coordinate internet governance and cyber security policies with like-minded states in both regional forums and the United Nations. By introducing security concerns and advocating more hierarchy and a greater role for governments, Moscow is contributing to the politicization of global cyber issues and seeking to reshape the network in accordance with its own domestic political interests. Indeed, the Russian leadership has come to consider the foreign policy of the internet as the establishment of a new US-led hegemonic framework that Washington would use to subvert other sovereign states with its own world views and values.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|