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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
133403
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Land-sea wars" have significant maritime dimensions, with command of the sea posited by this study as mattering more than either [land combat] skill or strength. . . . [C]ommand of the sea is a preeminent form of power that determines the outcome of land-sea conflicts.
JOHN ARQUILLA
In a February 2012 article published in the American Interest, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staffof the U.S. Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, provide solid justification for more closely integrating Air Force and Navy capabilities into an Air-Sea Battle strategy.1 We applaud the Air-Sea Battle component as the most effective means of preparing for the most challenging conflict-full-scale conventional war
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| 2 |
ID:
078813
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| 3 |
ID:
092703
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| 4 |
ID:
034829
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| Publication |
Maryland, U.S. Naval Institute, 1986.
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| Description |
xiii, 316p.
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| Standard Number |
0870215812
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 031686 | 359.4209/HUG 031686 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
122545
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Today's American navy writes prolifically about maritime strategies but has
not devoted equal attention to campaign plans or analysis that tests the strategies' viability. We illustrate herein how the operational-or campaign-level
links policy and strategy to the tactical and technological elements of war at sea.
First, we relate how the U.S. Navy reluctantly came to accept the existence of an
operational level of warfare but having done so will find it useful. Second, we describe important properties of naval operations in terms of constants, trends, and
variables in warfare at and from the sea. Third, we demonstrate how operationallevel planning would help if the Navy and the nation were to adopt six clearly
stated, twenty-first-century strategies that would serve present and future national policies better than do current strategy documents.
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| 6 |
ID:
133065
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is appropriate for the Naval War College Review to reprint the superb essay by Admiral Ya'ari, because
the things he foresaw nearly twenty years ago are all coming to pass-an analytical performance worthy of any Old Testament prophet. The growing hazards and deadliness of the littoral seas are something all navies must take into account, but particularly the U.S. Navy, because it is only just beginning to grasp the uniqueness of the littoral environment, the need for new tactics, and the value of warships better suited to fight in its clutter. For example, with Professor Don Brutzman of the Naval Postgraduate School, I have reached the conclusion that the goal of "networkcentric warfare" (NCW) is appropriate only for operating an aircraft carrier battle group, an expeditionary strike group, or a surface action group, none of which can perform its function without radiating almost continuously. But NCW is ill suited for more numerous, distributable, smaller, and less expensive ships intended to fight in the demanding environment described by Admiral Ya'ari.
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| 7 |
ID:
132187
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this cost-constrained era, when it comes to responding to threats in dangerous coastal waters, a single-purpose ship is best suited to the task.
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