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ID:
097710
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the organised nature of advance-fee fraud is incidental to the activities carried out by scammers and so should not attract the same level of attention as other organised criminal groups. The article concludes that although states should be responsible for the prevention and punishment of the perpetrators within their boundaries, there should be a coordination of efforts between the different states' security apparatuses because of the loose arrangements between some of the criminal elements and the cross-boundary nature of the crime.
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| 2 |
ID:
133285
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the political, economic and ecological context within which environmental insecurity emerges and feeds back into a fortress mentality. Shortages of food, water and energy sources are the trigger for nefarious activities involving organized criminal networks, transnational corporations and governments at varying political levels. The consequences of such activities contribute to even more ruthless exploitation of rapidly vanishing natural resources, as well as the further diminishment of air, soil and water quality. These developments, in turn, exacerbate the competitive scramble by individuals, groups and nations for what is left. The accompanying insecurities and vulnerabilities ensure elite and popular support for self-interested 'security'. Accordingly, the 'fortress' is being constructed and reconstructed at individual, local, national and regional levels-as both an attitude of mind and a material reality. Fundamentally, the basis for this fortress mentality is linked to decades of neo-liberal policy and practice that have embedded an individualizing and competitive self-interest that, collectively, is overriding prudent and precautionary policy construction around climate change and environmental degradation. The net result is that security is being built on a platform of state, corporate and organized group wrongdoing and injustice, in many instances with the implied and/or overt consent of relevant publics. Yet, as long as the fortification continues apace, it will contribute to and further exacerbate varying levels of insecurity for all.
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| 3 |
ID:
078970
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2007.
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This study focuses on the structure and evolution of a drug importation network that operated from Montreal, Canada, and that was the target of an extensive 2-year criminal investigation. The investigation was atypical in that it followed a seize-but-do-not-arrest strategy - while 11 drug shipments were seized by police throughout this period, arrests were never made until the final phase of the investigation. Such a case offers a rare opportunity to study the dynamics of a criminal network under intense surveillance and disruption. The reconstruction of the importation network is based on electronic communication transcripts that were intercepted and compiled during the investigation. Findings from analyses of the principal changes that took place within the communication network reveal how network centralization and critical node status are variable, and not static, properties of a criminal network under considerable constraint. The study demonstrates how a criminal network decentralizes and is re-ordered in response to intense law-enforcement targeting. Contributions are made to research on disruption in criminal networks. We conclude with a discussion on how a criminal network's flexibility, a feature generally presented as a sign of resilience, may contribute to a more significant demise within a context of intensive control
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| 4 |
ID:
149750
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| Summary/Abstract |
Colombian voters have narrowly rejected a peace deal with the insurgent group FARC. Annette Idler surveys the prospects for security in the country's border regions.
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| 5 |
ID:
097167
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2010.
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Motivated by the links between terror and crime and the difficulty in directly detecting terror activity, this article formulates and solves a resource allocation problem on overlapping networks to determine if interdiction efforts may be able to take advantage of these connections. The government, knowing only the general structure and overlap of the networks, allocates its scarce resources to investigate each terror and criminal network. There are two stages to the investigation: an initial investigation of all nodes (i.e., terrorists or criminals) and a secondary investigation of criminals identified during the initial investigation to determine if they are terrorists. Applying the model to data derived from a population of terrorists in the United States between 1971-2003 suggests that the government may be able to exploit the terror connections of crimes that are relatively uncommon, somewhat easy to detect, and are attractive to terrorists.
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| 6 |
ID:
102140
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