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| 1 |
ID:
079071
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When initial automobile environmental standards were introduced during the 1970s and 1980s there was a large difference in the level and timing of the introduction of these initial emission standards in the United States, Japan and Europe. Trade in automobiles was the target of fierce trade disputes in the 1980s between, for example, the United States and Japan. The governments of Japan, the United States and Europe were involved in trade negotiations as agents of the automobile industry of each country, often focusing on environmental standards as sources of non-tariff barriers. But since the mid-1990s, because of the globalization of the automobile industry, automobile firms have had common interests in collaborating in relation to voluntary harmonized standards. They also have common interests in relation to other sectors such as the petroleum industry in that the burden for emission reductions needs to be shared equitably among sectors. In that sense, it can be said that a 'depoliticizing strategy' has been used, which is the strategy used by the automobile industry not to rely on government intervention and trade conflicts at an intergovernmental level to deal with the difference in standards. There is a tendency for high-level convergence concerning environmental emission standards for NOx etc. in Japan, the United States and Europe and related sulfur content standards for complying with them. In addition, the automobile industry has been consciously seeking international harmonization through the Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) and the TrilateralWorking Group. Harmonization has also been attempted at the intergovernmental level to gain legitimacy at the arena of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) through the signing of the 1995 Agreement (the revision of 1958 Agreement) and the establishment of the 1998 Global Agreement. In the process, governments have been requested by automobile firms to adopt harmonized standards; but governments also have their own incentives to set up an intergovernmental mechanism to establish harmonized standards.
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| 2 |
ID:
079072
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In October 2005 UNESCO produced its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. This was largely a response to the worries of countries, especially in Europe and not least of which France, which feared the damaging effects to their cultures if trade in entertainment products remained too one-sided. Generally the argument of this paper is that while initial tensions between the United States and Europe were motivated by the usual commercial concerns, Europeans were increasingly worried about the cultural impact of this commerce. The Japanese, however, have not been nearly so concerned as the Europeans about becoming 'Americanized'. This lack of tension between the United States and Japan in the area of film and television is due to several factors. First, there is a complementarity between American entertainment and the Japanese electronics industry. Second, the Japanese are major players in some aspects of the entertainment industry, most especially in the area of animation, and they are especially influential in Asia. Finally, issues of cultural conflict between the United States and Japan are simply less salient to Tokyo than those which characterize Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors
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| 3 |
ID:
079068
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| 4 |
ID:
079067
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| 5 |
ID:
079074
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Regional financial arrangements and monetary integration in East Asia and Europe have made considerable progress in recent years. This paper discusses whether governments in both regions, Japan and Germany as the most advanced regional economies in particular, can use the new dynamics as levers to raise their status vis-Ã -vis the United States. It will be argued that activities are defensive rather than offensive, aiming at protecting the respective region from financial risk. Japan, in particular, would find it difficult to raise its status vis-Ã -vis the United States significantly by promoting regional financial and monetary integration, principal reasons being actor heterogeneity, the role of China, hesitation to bear burden and risk, and the historical legacy of a bank-oriented system
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| 6 |
ID:
079069
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| 7 |
ID:
079070
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For all its success in other high-technology sectors, Japan has largely failed to develop a strong aerospace sector. Its leading firms do not market finished aircraft and, in stark contrast to other sectors, the aerospace industry features a trade deficit with the United States. Japanese firms seem trapped as suppliers of components and sub-assemblies, mainly for the US industry. The general explanation for this state of affairs is that the Japanese industry has been effectively 'captured' by the United States; Boeing in particular dominates the sector and has effectively locked the Japanese firms into a relationship where moving up the value chain is difficult. This relationship may be changing. Japan's government has placed renewed emphasis on developing Japan's aerospace sector, while matters are evolving at the corporate level too, with Boeing's relations with Japan revealing a steadily increasing work share for the Japanese industry. The rise of Asia as an important market, and technological change making aerospace more like other manufacturing industries, presents Japanese firms with new incentives and opportunities beyond the US relationship.
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| 8 |
ID:
079073
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.
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