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| 1 |
ID:
123901
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AS STATED IN THE DECREES issued by President Vladimir Putin on May 7, 2012,1 as well as in Russia's national programs and other official documents currently in force,2 the tasks of modernization and innovative development of the Russian economy call for a carefully built policy of engagement with the international institutions, which exert a growing influence on the creation of the external conditions for the realization of the goals. This is becoming particularly relevant amid a deep economic crisis superimposed on the long-term processes of shifts of economic power in the global economy and amid external risks and uncertainty caused by this growth.
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| 2 |
ID:
100620
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| 3 |
ID:
108191
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| 4 |
ID:
137285
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE of the latter half of the 20th century was tipped in the early 1990s by the Soviet Union's disintegration which buried the bipolar world order. There is a more or less common opinion that we are entering a Cold Peace era in which Russia might be pushed aside.
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| 5 |
ID:
110444
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Money supply and loans relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are used as indicators of financial development. The empirical results, that money supply leads economic growth while economic growth leads loans, reflect the characteristics of the Russian economy. Oil price increases and the appreciation of the ruble increased money supply under insufficient sterilisation instruments, which, in turn, fostered economic growth. On the other hand, the Russian economic boom provided an incentive for banks to increase loans and their role in initiating economic growth is limited.
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| 6 |
ID:
100599
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| 7 |
ID:
117380
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
OUR COUNTRY'S PROMINENT ROLE in dealing with many global issues and regional conflicts, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, participation in the G8 and G20 - this is a far from complete list of criteria that reflect the geopolitical status of Russia. The completion of a multi-year negotiation process on the terms of Russian participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) lends credence to our consistent policy to integrate the country into the global economy and strengthens the international position of Russia as one of the key participants in the process of reforming the global economic architecture.
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| 8 |
ID:
087868
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is difficult to agree emotionally with the analysts and publicists who point out positive aspects of the on-going global economic crisis, yet there is undoubtedly one positive factor in it. The crisis has not only caused people to mobilize material and intellectual resources, but has forced one to consider how the economy may change in general and what has to be adjusted to secure its further development.
It is quite possible that anti-crisis measures, as hostages of inertia thinking, are far off the mark, and other solutions will be needed based on another paradigm for analyzing the economic matter. Regardless of speculations about the causes of the crisis, we all understand that the post-crisis economy will be different. What kind of economy will it be?
The very real possibility of a dangerous divergence between reality and expectations requires active efforts to develop the future economic model not only on the part of academic scientists, but also by those who are deeply involved in the economy and influence the functioning of the economy to a certain extent, i.e. business people. It is due to this involvement that the impact of the crisis becomes much more painful, while the need for its positive comprehension is felt more acutely.
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| 9 |
ID:
150806
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian economy is highly responsive to oil price fluctuations. At the start of 2014, the country was already suffering from the weak economic growth, partly due to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Western sanctions. The recent plunge in global oil prices put even further strain on the Russian economy. This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between oil price shocks, economic sanctions, and leading macroeconomic indicators in Russia. We apply a vector autoregression (VAR) to quantify the effects of oil price shocks as well as western economic sanctions on real GDP, real effective exchange rate, inflation, real fiscal expenditures, real consumption expenditures, and external trade using quarterly data from 1999:1 until 2015:1. Our results show a significant impact of oil prices on the Russian economy. We predict that Russia’s economic outlook is not very optimistic. If sanctions remain until the end of 2017, the quarter-to-quarter real GDP will contract on average by 19 percent over the next two years.
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| 10 |
ID:
138220
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| Summary/Abstract |
Several years ago, Russia adopted an economic policy that prioritized modernization and innovation-based development. Despite all the difficulties encountered on the way, the Russian government has persevered in pursuing this policy and even strengthened some of its key aspects, primarily in the military-industrial complex.
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| 11 |
ID:
119291
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| 12 |
ID:
109732
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| 13 |
ID:
091406
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The unique form of capitalism that developed following the Yukos affair seems likely to survive the current economic upheaval.
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| 14 |
ID:
108194
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| 15 |
ID:
139057
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| Summary/Abstract |
In reacting to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine in early 2014, the US government did not call the Sixth Fleet into action; it did not ban all exports to Russia; it did not stop all cultural and educational exchanges. Rather, key elites close to “a senior Russian government official”—President Vladimir Putin—were targeted with asset seizures and visa bans.
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| 16 |
ID:
128251
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
According to their governments, economic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia-the two largest post-Soviet countries-have been exceptionally solid and robust. However, statistical data demonstrate that Russian investments in Kazakhstan's economy have been weak, and that Kazakhstan has only recently increased investment in the Russian economy. This raises the question of whether relations between the two countries have been more uneven than has been claimed officially. The article also explores the influence of off-shore investments via third countries and other aspects of the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and the involvement of each country in the other's economy.
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| 17 |
ID:
032489
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| Publication |
New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1971.
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| Description |
xii, 682p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0471855103
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 006929 | 947.07/THA 006929 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
106218
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the start of market reforms, enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex have lived through a massive crisis and a spectacular revival. Using original data from a longitudinal survey covering the period of 1995-2006, this article analyses the impact of transformation in the defence industry on labour and labour-management relations. We find that by the mid-2000s defence enterprises were largely able to stop job losses, eliminate wage arrears and restore wages to the level prevailing in the civilian economy. The study confirms that compared to other sectors of the Russian economy, defence enterprises continue to carry a strong legacy of the Soviet system. The dominant role of state ownership and government orders, along with the relative geographical isolation of defence enterprises and obvious factors of secrecy and security, made labour at these enterprises less willing to challenge management or owners by strikes and open protests. On the other hand, workers of defence enterprises can count on a more paternalistic attitude from managers and relatively more generous welfare benefits.
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| 19 |
ID:
079086
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question addressed in this article is whether the recent strong growth of the Russian economy is sustainable. The main difficulty is assessing the conflicting evidence. Developments since the financial crisis of 1998 are reviewed, including growth performance and macro-economic management. There is an analysis of the nature and extent of Russian economic dependence on exports of oil and gas and the direction towards state control since 2003 is described. The article reviews the interaction of competitive power politics among the political elite with economic policy and assesses factors favouring and factors working against continued rapid growth over the next five years. One conclusion is that informal rules operating in the economy differ across sectors, and Russian economic development is in part robust; but there are powerful influences working towards a slowdown in growth
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| 20 |
ID:
138219
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent weeks, an increasing number of analysts and commentators have been referring to an actual or looming economic crisis in Russia. Many compare recent developments, and especially the likelihood of a further deterioration this year, with the Russia economic crisis of August 1998. This comparison is exaggerated at best. It also distracts from the real issue that threatens the country's future economic prospects.
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