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ID:
079474
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For some, cosmopolitanism is a deeply troubling, even dangerous, ethical position. An 'embedded cosmopolitan' variation on this position would strive to take seriously the apprehensions of these critics by eschewing the impartialist perspective to which it is conventionally tied. Specifically, this proposed alternative would adopt a modified version of the particularist moral starting point espoused by so-called 'communitarian' political theorists. In order to retain its ethical cosmopolitan credentials, such a stance would have to achieve a moral purview that left no-one, whether compatriot or foreigner, ally or enemy, beyond either concern or comprehension. Trying to construct this qualified cosmopolitanism is a difficult and daunting task. By analysing the various attempts of the American political philosopher Michael Walzer to reconcile a radically situated account of morality (his 'view from the cave') with an inclusive and cross-culturally critical moral purview, this article aims to map the most promising route towards an embedded cosmopolitan position. At the same time, it endeavours to pay due attention to a much broader range of Walzer's writings than is generally acknowledged within the study of international relations
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| 2 |
ID:
153845
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| Summary/Abstract |
The laws of war are under mounting pressure and yet recent developments in the ethics of war have encouraged a growing disjunction between ethics and the law. Is this a problem, and does just war have a responsibility to address it? How then should we think about the relationship between ethics and law in war? Focusing on the debates between orthodox and revisionist theorists about principles of liability and immunity in war, I argue that these are actually about competing conceptions of justness. Revisionists privilege a ‘best ethics’ approach to justness, whereas orthodox theorists tend to work within a more rounded conception that embraces the legal and political dimensions of the regulation of war. I argue that there is a danger that those revisionist theorists, despite their impressive ethical innovations, nonetheless operate in a reductive way that does little to assist with the contemporary plight of law, and may inadvertently offer but ‘miserable comfort’ to those caught up in the battlefield. In contrast, the just war tradition generally is rooted in a practice that makes greater allowance for a politically configured concept of war, and takes more seriously the requirement for effective law.
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