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| 1 |
ID:
154742
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| Summary/Abstract |
Politicians (and journalists covering them) assume that association with the military has political consequences. We propose and experimentally test conditions under which military images have such effects. We presented subjects with images of the US president before varying backgrounds—including soldiers, students, children, and “ordinary” people. Only the image of soldiers has any significant effect, shifting participant preferences toward spending money on defense over education. The image does this by increasing respondent sense of threats to national security, despite the military’s depiction out of combat and in the background. The soldiers image does little to shift opinion about the president. However, the image has the largest hawkish effect on both the president’s copartisans and the strongest supporters. Given the routine use by many democracies of tactics unlikely to produce images of one’s fellow citizens in combat, the power of more sanitized images to cue hawkish policy preferences requires increased attention.
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| 2 |
ID:
084031
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, the authors measure experienced guilt in a prisoner's-dilemma experiment with preplay communication. The authors find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. The authors also find that fining unilateral defection reduces feelings of guilt.
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| 3 |
ID:
186411
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| Summary/Abstract |
Long-term capacity cycles in electricity markets are a challenge to policy makers, bringing instability in energy prices, and jeopardizing security of supply. There is evidence of capacity cycles in electricity markets using conventional technologies from empirical data, experimental work and simulation studies. In this article we study the effects of the availability of new technologies on the investment cycles observed, using economic experiments performed in a laboratory setting. We consider the decision making process with a new technology that has shorter construction delays, shorter lifetime and an alternative cost structure, compared to the conventional technologies previously studied. Our experimental design follows the current trends to de-carbonize electricity production by introducing variable renewable energy sources (VRES) as part of the generation portfolio. We find that the introduction of VRES does not dampen the capacity oscillations observed. In fact, the shorter delays in construction and technology lifetimes create shorter, more frequent cycles. We provide recommendations to manage the increased cyclical nature in the transition to a low carbon economy.
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| 4 |
ID:
192872
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ongoing nuclear modernization programs in Russia, China, and the USA have reopened longstanding debates among scholars concerning whether tailored nuclear weapons are likely to have destabilizing consequences for international security. Without data to adjudicate this debate, however, these discussions have remained entirely theoretical. In this article, we introduce an experimental wargaming platform, SIGNAL, to quantify the effect of tailored nuclear capabilities on the nuclear threshold in a simulated environment. We then compare these results with a survey experiment using scenarios related to military basing, cyber operations, and nuclear threats from the wargame environment. While the survey experiments suggest that the presence of tailored nuclear capabilities increases the likelihood of conflict escalation, this trend diminishes in the wargaming context. Across both data-generating processes, we find support for the proposition that lower-yield nuclear weapons are used as a substitute for their higher-yield counterparts. These results have consequences for recent and ongoing policy debates concerning strategic posture and the future of arms control. This work also makes methodological contributions to the design and application of experimental wargaming for social science research, particularly for scenarios where data are limited or non-existent.
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| 5 |
ID:
100287
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries, and in the second stage, the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first-stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase, while the second-stage expenditures decrease in the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties. Contrary to the theory, however, expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent's expenditures in the first stage increases the second-stage expenditures and decreases the first-stage expenditures.
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| 6 |
ID:
122485
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Citizens will need to change their behaviour in pro-social ways if governments are to address current challenges in public policy. But how best to promote behaviour change? The argument in this article is that a decentralised rather than a top-down approach is particularly suitable, which can encourage innovation in the public sector and involve citizens in the implementation of policies. As a method of evaluating interventions, randomised controlled trials have a unique role to play in improving the design of policies, particularly if carried out responsively and adaptively. A culture of experimentation would value curiosity, feedback and the continual testing of interventions. The article includes three examples of experimentation: young people's political attitudes, voter turnout and donations for charity. As the popularity of 'nudge' interventions grows-shown by the success of the UK government's Behavioural Insights Team-the practice of experimentation in the public sector could become the norm.
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| 7 |
ID:
144799
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| Summary/Abstract |
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the dynamics of individual behavior. A behavioral model that incorporates a nonmonetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization explains significant overexpenditure of effort. It also suggests that decrease in “social distance” between group members through social identification promotes prosocial behavior and decreases overexpenditure of effort, while improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort.
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| 8 |
ID:
115730
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker's objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender's objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the authors' experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.
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| 9 |
ID:
079526
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Realists in international relations and realistic conflict theorists in social psychology argue that the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of power asymmetries between groups. In contrast, social constructivists and social identity theorists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions of intergroup threat. In this article, we test these competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States). Four findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas
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| 10 |
ID:
142047
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| Summary/Abstract |
While there is widespread debate about techniques for obtaining information from non-cooperative sources, there is little research concerning the efficacy of different methods. We introduce the ‘Interrogation Game’ as a simple model of the information a source will provide when faced with either (1) an interrogator using coercive techniques or (2) an interrogator offering rewards. The model demonstrates that coercive interrogation results in a very slight increase in accurate information from knowledgeable sources, but much more inaccurate information from ignorant sources. In short, when ignorant group members refuse to provide information, this increases the inequality of payoffs among group members under coercion while the same behavior – truthfully revealing ignorance – decreases the inequality of payoffs under reward. If ignorant detainees have concern for the payoffs of their other group members, they will admit their ignorance in reward, but not coercion. We test the model with a group-based experiment. As the model predicts, coercion leads subjects to provide more inaccurate information. Contrary to the model’s expectations, however, accurate information is almost equally likely in the coercion and reward treatments.
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| 11 |
ID:
166497
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the first decade of the 21st century, there was considerable interest in the potential for reducing the reliance on centralised energy systems and introducing greater decentralisation through localised initiatives, particularly in urban areas. A range of such initiatives were evidence of an emerging movement for bottom-up change in energy systems. This involved a variety of actors, technologies, economic models and modes of engagement with the public. Indeed, research undertaken in the UK found over 50 possible pathways for change based on such urban energy projects. However, the following decade has seen considerable changes in the context for such initiatives, particularly with regard to national policy frameworks. Returning to a database collected in 2010–11, this paper analyses the nature of the projects that have survived and those that have not. It finds that the hope of localised urban action for changing energy systems rests largely with community-based projects, but that these are fragile, with limited capacity and dependent on having a sound financial model for their survival. The paper concludes with suggestions for how such localised urban action could be reinvigorated but also assesses the current role of such local action.
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| 12 |
ID:
178206
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most intractable debates in IR revolves around the severity and frequency of the security dilemma. Offensive realists argue that states are compelled to make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, which yields inexorable competition and conflict even between mutually-benign actors. Yet others have argued that rational benign states should always be able to find cooperative signals that are costly enough to be credible, but not too costly to risk sending. If true, this should alleviate the security dilemma and facilitate cooperation, even under high initial distrust. However, there is little empirical work on interstate reassurance and the conditions under which mutually-benign actors can build trust. We address this gap using laboratory experiments to test Andrew Kydd’s canonical model of the security dilemma. We find strong support for the directional effects of the hypothesized signaling mechanisms. However, the frequency of cooperation is significantly lower than the model predicts, and the feasibility of reassurance is highly sensitive to the degree of prior trust. This implies that although reassurance can mitigate the security dilemma, offensive realism may still capture important psychological mechanisms that impede interstate cooperation.
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| 13 |
ID:
165331
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| Summary/Abstract |
To date, cyber security research is built on observational studies involving macro-level attributes as causal factors that account for state behaviour in cyberspace. While this tradition resulted in significant findings, it abstracts the importance of individual decision-makers. Specifically, these studies have yet to provide an account as to why states fail to integrate available information resulting in suboptimal judgements such as the misattribution of cyber operations. Using a series of vignette experiments, the study demonstrates that cognitive heuristics and motivated reasoning play a crucial role in the formation of judgements vis-à-vis cyberspace. While this phenomenon is frequently studied relative to the physical domain, it remains relatively unexplored in the context of cyberspace. Consequently, this study extends the existing literature by highlighting the importance of micro-level attributes in interstate cyber interactions.
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| 14 |
ID:
190836
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces a simple application of contest theory that neatly captures how Boulding’s ‘loss of strength gradient’ determines the geographic extent of territory. We focus on the ‘supply side’ of territorial conflict, showing how the costs of initiating and escalating conflict over spatially dispersed resources shape the nature and scope of territory. We show that economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting power at a distance combine to affect the intensive and extensive margins of conflict, and ultimately the geographic distribution of territory. Comparative statics analysis shows how the distribution of conflict and territory change as costs change, helping shed light on, for example, why new transportation technologies have historically led to a redrawing of territorial boundaries. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in two experiments varying the marginal costs of conflict over space and the fixed costs of entry. Increases in both costs interact to increase the probability of exclusive territories. The first experiment directly tests the theory in a static, one-shot setting that strictly matches the information conditions studied in the theory. The second experiment examines conflict behavior under conditions analogous to those in conflicts outside the lab: where no contestant knows the probability of winning, let alone the function determining that probability, and parties interact repeatedly. Median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.
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| 15 |
ID:
190760
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does targeting in armed conflict affect public opinion in conflict zones? Armed actors choose between targeting militaries and civilians, further choosing whether to target civilians discriminately or indiscriminately. Existing work suggests these choices have important implications for conflict dynamics, in part by influencing public opinion, yet the causal effects of these choices on individual attitudes have not been clearly established. We conduct a survey experiment in the Donbas region of Ukraine, an area that has witnessed years of protracted fighting. We find that reports of civilian targeting robustly reduce approval of both the government and separatist forces. However, we find that the effects of discriminate civilian targeting are not statistically distinguishable from those of indiscriminate civilian targeting. Finally, we find that our respondents generally preferred a restrained, rather than reciprocal, response from actors in this armed conflict. We explain the implications of our findings for theories of wartime violence.
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| 16 |
ID:
161551
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why is it so hard to get opposing elites to work together rather than to seek partisan gains and/or political survival? While the credible commitment problem is widely known, there are a number of lesser known obstacles to building trust and trustworthiness between opposing elites. This article presents an account of how some of those obstacles interact through time. Common institutional types, particularly winner-takes-all and power-sharing institutions, force trade-offs between agile responses in the short term and medium-term trust between elites, on the one hand, and between trust among elites in the medium term and the adaptability of agreements in the long term, on the other. We call this the ‘time horizon trilemma’. As an alternative approach, we consider a variant on the two-person consulate used by the Roman Republic for more than 400 years as Rome rose to prominence. In our variant, a ‘turn-taking institution’, opposing executives take short alternating turns as the ultimate decisionmaker within one term. We conduct behavioral games in the experimental lab to provide an initial estimate of the impact of these institutional types – winner-takes-all, requiring consensus only, requiring turn-taking only, or requiring both – on overcoming obstacles to agile responses in the short term, trust among elites in the medium term, and adaptability of agreements in the long term. We find that turn-taking is a promising alternative to solving the time horizon trilemma.
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| 17 |
ID:
162441
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do costly signals work? Despite their widespread popularity, both hands-tying and sunk-cost signaling have come under criticism, and there’s little direct evidence that leaders understand costly signals the way our models tell us they should. We present evidence from a survey experiment fielded on a unique sample of elite decision makers from the Israeli Knesset. We find that both types of costly signaling are effective in shaping assessments of resolve for both leaders and the public. However, although theories of signaling tend to assume homogenous audiences, we show that leaders vary significantly in how credible they perceive signals to be, depending on their foreign policy dispositions, rather than their levels of military or political experience. Our results thus encourage international relations scholars to more fully bring heterogeneous recipients into our theories of signaling and point to the important role of dispositional orientations for the study of leaders.
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| 18 |
ID:
167283
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| Summary/Abstract |
Audience cost theory posits that concern over the nation’s reputation pushes voters to sanction leaders who make empty threats because they tarnish the nation’s honor. We question the empirical support for that theory. We show that survey vignettes in the previous experimental literature conflate audience costs generated by inconsistency and belligerence with approval losses arising from the perception that the leader is incompetent. These ‘incompetence costs’ are due to leaders not achieving audiences’ preferred outcomes. Our article contributes to the literature on audience costs by disentangling inconsistency and belligerence costs from incompetence costs, which we find are the larger component of audience costs. We also make a methodological contribution: we show that experimental designs in previous studies cannot test the different mechanisms; that previous estimates of audience costs are biased because treatments affect respondents’ beliefs about the likely outcome of policy actions; and we suggest a new experimental framework to estimate audience costs. Our results are consistent with arguments that audiences care more about policy outcomes than about leaders’ inconsistency or belligerence during a crisis.
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| 19 |
ID:
133704
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict; but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder's decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate.
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| 20 |
ID:
174727
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the obvious the risks involved in deterrence bargaining, we know surprisingly little about how the public evaluates risk during a crisis. A limited deterrence scholarship considers domestic preferences and tends to assume that the public’s risk tolerance remains stable throughout a deterrence episode. Yet, robust findings in cognitive psychology suggest that people’s risk tolerance can shift dramatically based on how the potential outcomes of military options are framed. We evaluate these competing views through a series of decision experiments grounded in prospect theory. Across an array of potential extended deterrence scenarios, we demonstrate that simply reframing the language used to describe the possible outcome of military options affects both the public’s willingness to accept risks and, therefore, their willingness to escalate the crisis. These findings condition long-standing concerns about the public’s intransigent risk disposition, which underpin research on costly signaling, deterrence traps, and nuclear self-deterrence.
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