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| 1 |
ID:
109488
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis will be tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work will examine the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.
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| 2 |
ID:
159899
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda leaders have consistently praised the Chechen insurgents as an exemplary front of global jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri recently applauded the steadfastness of the Chechen rebels and indicated that their resolve for jihad is worthy of emulation. Ever since the world found out about a war going on in the Muslim republic in the North Caucasus, Al Qaeda leadership has attempted to represent the Chechen struggle as one of its own battlefields. In turn, the Russian government has tried to justify its policies in the North Caucasus through demonstrating to the world that the Kremlin is fighting nothing less than Osama bin Laden’s agents in Chechnya. The North Caucasus insurgents in turn have embraced some of Al Qaeda’s narratives. While such narratives have proliferated, the factual evidence to show the direct links between the North Caucasus insurgents and Al Qaeda is still lacking. The article examines how terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda use framing for strategic ends. The evidence discussed here suggests that Al Qaeda, the North Caucasus insurgents, and the Russian government have adopted similar narratives. However, the lack of evidence to back up such narratives indicates the differences in reasons driving the convergence of the narratives.
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| 3 |
ID:
020603
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| Publication |
Dec 2001.
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| Description |
48-49
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| 4 |
ID:
142646
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article fills the gap in existing scholarship on asymmetric conflict, indigenous forces, and how socio-cultural codes shape the dynamics and outcomes of conflict transformation. Specifically, it identifies three key socio-cultural values commonplace in honorific societies: retaliation, hospitality, and silence. As sources of effective pro-insurgent violent mobilisation and support from among the local population, these values provide insurgents with an asymmetric advantage over much stronger incumbents. Using the case studies of the two Russian counterinsurgencies in Chechnya, the article shows the mechanisms on the ground through which Moscow’s deployment of indigenous forces against insurgents helped to stem the tide of conflict, reversing the insurgents’ initial advantage in terms of asymmetry of values.
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| 5 |
ID:
099171
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The achievement of the objectives of international security, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement, like the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan after the initial invasions, and of unilateral security operations, like those in Chechnya, Lebanon and Gaza, is often threatened by high levels of civilian casualties and physical destruction. Much of this is legitimized under the laws of armed conflict, notably the principles of legitimate military objectives and collateral damage, but would be contrary to human rights standards. This article argues that the claim that the laws of armed conflict and human rights are complementary is misleading and that international and national security, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations designed to protect and promote human rights should in principle be conducted under human rights standards. It explains how this could be achieved for international operations conducted under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or status-of-forces agreements.
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| 6 |
ID:
054077
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| 7 |
ID:
057639
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| 8 |
ID:
059422
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| 9 |
ID:
114721
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| 10 |
ID:
064895
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| Publication |
Sep-Oct 2005.
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| 11 |
ID:
058296
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| 12 |
ID:
060712
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| 13 |
ID:
082073
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson analyze Russian public opinion about the second war in Chechnya. They show that concern over Russian military casualties and the war's economic costs were the dominant sentiments, despite the Russian government's monopoly on media coverage of the conflict. Moreover, they argue that the war appears to have fueled ethnic animosity toward Chechens
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| 14 |
ID:
065886
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| 15 |
ID:
065682
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| 16 |
ID:
052154
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| 17 |
ID:
051747
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| 18 |
ID:
106283
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| 19 |
ID:
062123
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2005.
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| 20 |
ID:
065678
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