Publication |
2007.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the effects that the U.S. biotech-pharmaceutical industry has had on U.S. government policy, specifically on the 2001 decision to reject the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention verification protocol. It concludes that the biotech-pharmaceutical industry's concerns for the protection of trade secrets contributed to the weakening of the proposed inspection regime, particularly through its demands for managed access. This added to doubts among U.S. policymakers regarding the protocol's effectiveness. However, this article cautions against blaming industry for the rejection of the verification protocol, when most of the responsibility lies with government. A poorly handled 1994 visit to a Pfizer facility coordinated by the State Department resulted in increased wariness of international inspections within industry. Furthermore, both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency had reasons to object to the proposed regime because it could result in the exposure of their own secret biodefense research. Finally, though the biotech-pharmaceutical industry's lobbying efforts may have led to the rejection of the protocol, it should be expected that any industry will try to minimize regulation. It is the responsibility of government, not industry, to decide the best way to achieve national interests, whether through the enhancement of the biological weapons regime or through the continued support of favored industries. If government chooses poorly, then government ought to be criticized.
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