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ID:
108618
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite outward appearances, the CIA's evolution between 1945 and 1953 was influenced by two objective investigations - the Eberstadt Task Force and Dulles Commission - and was accelerated, but not instigated, by the shock of the Korean War. The role of these two investigations, which ultimately resulted in NSC 50 and the establishment of the CIA as a viable member of the US intelligence community, has been overlooked in recent literature. While these panels played a critical role in shaping the CIA's organization during this period, the Truman administration never achieved its goal of establishing a truly 'central' intelligence organization. This article examines the formation of the CIA, discusses both reports, national policy changes enacted in response, and relevance to the US intelligence community's current operations.
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| 2 |
ID:
079762
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| 3 |
ID:
095496
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the difficulties associated with military-led stability and nationbuilding operations and argues that the United States' current policy negatively affects defence capabilities, unduly influences how stability operations are prioritized and conducted, limits State Department capacities, and allows the military to be seen as the 'face' of American foreign policy. Several options exist for the United States to adequately address this issue to include the working within the established system, a reassignment of leadership responsibilities, or restraining the American tendency to intervene. The United States' military has proven that it is capable of conducting nation-building operations, but at the cost of global misperception, painful inefficiency, significant risks to United States' overall defence capabilities, and the issues of civilian control that follow from reliance on warriors in the role of diplomats.
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